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WILL LAW FIRMS GO PUBLIC? 
ROBERTA S. KARMEL* 
Law in the United States is a big business and big law firms 
(Big Law) are a global business.  The legal profession has evolved 
from solo practitioners and small general partnerships, practicing 
primarily in a single state and regulated by the courts of that state, 
to a more complicated and segmented industry, ranging from 
traditional small partnerships to giant multi-state and multi-
country organizations.  Yet in the current Great Recession, Big Law 
is under serious economic stress, epitomized by the bankruptcy of 
the venerable Dewey & LeBoeuf firm.1  In addition, the high cost of 
legal services has led to a lack of affordable representation for 
many individuals and small businesses. 
These developments have led to two related questions:  should 
law firms be allowed to accept equity capital from nonlawyers; and 
should lawyers be allowed to practice in firms with nonlawyers.  
These questions have been percolating for a number of years, and 
have been under consideration by the American Bar Association’s 
(ABA) Commission on Ethics 20/20 (Ethics Commission).2  
                                                     
* Roberta S. Karmel is Centennial Professor of Law and Co-Director of the 
Dennis J. Block Center for the Study of International Business Law at Brooklyn 
Law School.  She is a former Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.  A summer research grant from Brooklyn Law School was of 
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1 See James B. Stewart, Dewey’s Fall Underscores Law Firms’ New Reality, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 5, 2012, at B1 (highlighting the fiscal pressures Big Law firms 
currently face leading to the failure of once respected firms). 
2 James Podgers, Ethics 20/20 Commission Seeks Input on Alternative Business 
Structures for Law Firms, ABA JOURNAL (Apr. 5, 2011, 1:53 PM). http://www. 
abajournal.com/news/article/ethics_20_20_commission_seeks_input_on_ 
alternative_ business _structures_for_law_firms. 
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Although the Ethics Commission has now decided not to propose 
changes to ABA policy on nonlawyer ownership of law firms,3 this 
non-decision will not end debate about how to finance the law 
business.  This is in part because the United Kingdom, Australia, 
and other jurisdictions have already changed their regulatory 
frameworks for lawyers to allow the infusion of outside capital 
into law firms,4 and Big Law will find global competitive pressures 
to expand and compete with U.K. and Australian firms difficult to 
resist.  In addition, charges that legal ethics rules preventing law 
firms from experimenting with different types of business 
organizations are anti-competitive are likely to persist and receive 
a sympathetic hearing in some quarters, and possibly some courts. 
The American Lawyer has been tracking the growth of Big Law 
for a quarter of a century.  During that time, the total gross 
revenues of the 100 largest firms (Am Law 100) have multiplied 
from $7 billion to $71 billion.5  Yet, there have been significant 
changes in the law firm model and the identity of the firms in the 
Am Law 100.  Growth has come largely from the movement of 
lateral partners, and eleven of the 1986 top twenty are no longer in 
the top twenty.6  Nevertheless, seven of the firms on the 1986 list 
increased their revenues per lawyer by 300% or more, and thirteen 
increased their revenues per lawyer by over 250%.7  This growth 
far exceeded the growth of other income earners in the United 
States, where per capita GDP grew only at an annualized rate of 
3.9%.8  Further, although this growth had been slowing since 2008, 
in 2011 gross revenue, revenue per lawyer, and profits per partner 
                                                     
3 James Podgers, Summer Job: Ethics 20/20 Commission Shelves Nonlawyer 
Ownership, Focuses on Other Proposals, ABA JOURNAL (June 1, 2012, 2:50 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/summer_job_ethics_20-
_20_commission_ shelves_nonlawyer_ownership. 
4 Erin J. Cox, An Economic Crisis Is a Terrible Thing to Waste: Reforming the 
Business of Law for a Sustainable and Competitive Future, 57 UCLA L. REV. 511, 533–
37 (2009).  
5 Michael D. Goldhaber, The Long Run, AM. LAW. (Apr. 27, 2012),  http:// 
www.americanlawyer. com/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202549688718.  
6 Id. 
7 Amy Kolz, Myth Busters, AM. LAW. (Apr. 27, 2012),  http://www. 
americanlawyer.com/id=1202549688935/Myth-Busters.  
8 Id. 
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all rose by single digit percentages for the Am Law 100.9  Four 
firms had 2011 gross revenues in excess of $2 billion, and another 
thirteen firms had gross revenues in excess of $1 billion.10  Also, 
twenty-two firms employed over 1,000 lawyers; five over 2,000.11 
This continued growth of Big Law should be counterbalanced 
against the decline in the profitability of the legal profession 
generally.  In 2007 and 2008, the legal services sector shed 40,000 
jobs.12  Further, a number of large firms collapsed into bankruptcy 
or closed their doors.13  One lesson of these failures was that 
financing through bank debt was problematic, and so some law 
firms have turned to third party funding in the form of hedge fund 
investment in litigation.14 
This Article will argue that, even if law firms retain the form of 
partnerships, they eventually will accept investments from third 
parties, and possibly even go public.  However, this development 
could lead to a loss of professionalism, as it has with other 
industries, and could also lead to the end of self-regulation.  While 
the changes that are coming to the legal profession are being and 
will continue to be resisted, for both good and bad reasons, it 
would be wise for the bar to think through what kind of regulation 
would best serve clients, the public, and the profession in the 
future.  This Article will discuss (in Part 1) legal ethics rules 
regarding law firm organization and the work of the Ethics 
Commission; (in Part 2) the changes to the regulation of lawyers in 
England, Australia, and elsewhere; (in Part 3) litigation attacking 
current ethics rules regarding outside investments in law firms; (in 
Part 4) the evolution of other industries from closely held 
partnerships or mutual organizations to large public companies, 
specifically investment banking and stock exchanges; and (in Part 
5) the future of the legal profession. 
                                                     
9 The Am Law 100: Firms Ranked by Gross Revenue 2012, AM. LAW., 
http://www.americanlawyer.com/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202549382505 (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2014). 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Cox, supra note 4, at 517. This figure includes support staff. 
13 Id. at 520–22. 
14 Id. at 524–25. 
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1.  RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
1.1.  American Bar Association Rules 
ABA Model Rule 5.4 provides that, “[a] lawyer or law firm 
shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer,” and “shall not form a 
partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the 
partnership consist of the practice of law.” 15  Similarly, Rule 5.4 of 
the New York Rules of Professional Conduct provides that “[a] 
lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer” and 
“[a] lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of an entity 
authorized to practice law for profit, if:  a nonlawyer owns any 
interest therein.” 16  These bans on multidisciplinary practice and 
nonlawyer ownership of law firm partnership interests are of long 
standing. 
The American Law Institute’s Restatement of the Law 
Governing Lawyers similarly provides: 
(1) A nonlawyer may not own any interest in a law firm, 
and a nonlawyer may not be empowered to or actually 
direct or control the professional activities of a lawyer in 
the firm.  (2) A lawyer may not form a partnership or other 
business enterprise with a nonlawyer if any of the activities 
of the enterprise consist of the practice of law.17 
Rule 5.4 is a standard promulgated by the ABA, and the ABA is 
a voluntary bar association.  It is not a government agency, and it 
does not have delegated governmental authority.18  It is more like a 
trade association than a self-regulatory organization, and not all 
lawyers belong to the ABA.  However, state bar associations and 
courts have incorporated this standard into their disciplinary rules, 
although not all states have done so uniformly. 
                                                     
15 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (1983), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/
model_rules_of_professional_conduct/rule_5_4_professional_independence_of_a
_lawyer.html. 
16 N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2009), available  at 
www.nycla.org/siteFiles/NYRulesofProfessionalConduct4109_362.pdf . 
17 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 10.1–.2 (2000).  
18 Gomez-Jimenez v. N.Y. Law Sch., 943 N.Y.S. 2d 834, 842 n.4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2012). 
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The prohibitions against multidisciplinary practices and 
nonlawyer investments in law firms have been justified as 
necessary to preserve independence and professionalism, to avoid 
conflicts of interest, and to preserve a lawyer’s duties to clients, 
especially the duty of confidentiality, and to the courts.19  
Nevertheless, these bans are also anti-competitive.  They stand in 
the way of the provision of low cost legal services in certain areas 
susceptible to commoditization, and they prevent clients from 
obtaining combined services from lawyers and other 
professionals.20  This is because the bans prevent firms from 
reaching an optimum size for the provision of higher quality and 
lower priced services, and to compete with nonlawyer 
organizations.  Further, lawyers are unable to realize the present 
economic value of their reputations through the sale of stock or 
other ownership interests.21  The basic concern animating the ethics 
rules is that permitting nonlawyer ownership or direction would 
subject lawyers to meeting the goals of the nonlawyers rather than 
meeting their duties to clients.22  In other words, business pressures 
would trump professionalism. 
The organized bar has feared that, on one hand, large 
accounting firms would combine with law firms,23 and on the 
other, that Walmart could provide legal services to customers.24  
But these realistic fears are not an adequate basis for preserving 
ethics rules that prevent law firms from obtaining capital for 
expansion, investment in new technologies, financing of 
contingency fee cases, or other experiments in the delivery of legal 
services.25  If these ethics rules are to be preserved, they need to be 
                                                     
19 Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing the Delivery of Legal Services, 73 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1, 15 (2012).  
20 See id. at 16 (arguing that the lack of competition results in higher legal 
costs for the general public, thus harming the public instead of protecting them). 
21 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 10 cmt. c (2000).  
22 Id. 
23 See Sydney M. Cone, III, International Legal Practice Involving England and 
New York Following Adoption of United Kingdom Legal Services Act of 2007, 28 NW. J. 
INT’L L. & BUS. 415, 416–17 (2008) (noting that the fear of such developments was 
pervasive at the time of the adoption of these rules following such partnership 
activity between law firms and large accounting firms in France). 
24 See Knake, supra note 19, at 37–40 (providing successful examples of retail 
legal operations in the United Kingdom feared by the organized bar). 
25 See Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, Law Firms on the Big Board?: A 
Proposal for Nonlawyer Investment in Law Firms, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1, 40 (1998) 
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justified as necessary to maintain the independence and 
professionalism of lawyers.  Although this may be a valid 
justification, in view of the existing shift of the legal profession 
from a profession to a business, the public distrust of lawyers, and 
client dissatisfaction with the cost of legal services, the professional 
values protected by current ethics rules needs to be spelled out. 
Unfortunately, for many years the ABA has neither articulated 
why the ethics rules should be preserved, nor proposed changes to 
the rules.  In 1998, the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary 
Practice  (MDP Commission) was created and began to study and 
report on the extent to which U.S. lawyers and law firms should be 
allowed to enter into “alternative law practice structures in which 
nonlawyers have an ownership interest” and “whether such 
practices could operate in a manner that is consistent with the 
American legal profession’s core values.”26  The impetus for the 
work of the MDP Commission was that the large accounting firms 
had consulting practices that performed work similar to the 
provision of legal services.27  One year after its creation, the MDP 
Commission issued a report to the ABA House of Delegates 
recommending that the ABA ethics rules be changed to permit 
multidisciplinary practices conditioned on safeguards to ensure 
that the core values of the legal profession be maintained.28  
However, the ABA House of Delegates rejected the 
recommendation and resolved not to change or amend the Model 
Rules to allow lawyers to offer legal services through 
multidisciplinary practices “until additional study demonstrates 
                                                     
(concluding that on balance, the benefits of lifting the restrictions on nonlawyer 
investment in law firms outweigh the harms, and therefore they must be lifted); 
see also generally Robert W. Gordon, Portrait of a Profession in Paralysis, 54 STAN. L. 
REV. 1427 (2002) (reviewing DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: 
REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2000)) (proposing the lifting of restrictions on 
these activities). 
26 ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, Discussion Draft, at 1 (2011) [hereinafter 
Ethics Comm’n Discussion Draft for Cmt. of Dec. 2011], available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20
111202-ethics2020-discussion_draft-alps.authcheckdam.pdf.   
27 ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, Working Group on Alt. Bus. Structures 
Request for Cmt.: Issues Paper Concerning Alternative Business Structures, at 5 
(2011) [hereinafter Ethics Comm’n Request for Cmt. of Apr. 2011], available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/ab
s_issues_paper.authcheckdam.pdf. 
28 Id. at 6. 
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that such changes will further the public interest without 
sacrificing or compromising lawyer independence and the legal 
profession’s tradition of loyalty to clients.”29 
The MDP Commission continued to study and accept 
comments on these issues, and in July 2000 it issued a new report 
to the House of Delegates again recommending changes to the 
Model Rules, but with “more restrictions on proposed 
multidisciplinary practices” than before.30  The key change in the 
new report was that “only lawyer-controlled MDPs would be 
permitted under the new recommendation.”31  The House again 
rejected the MDP Commission’s recommendation stating that 
“[t]he sharing of legal fees with nonlawyers and the ownership 
and control of the practice of law by nonlawyers are inconsistent 
with the core values of the legal profession” and the rule 
prohibiting such sharing of fees “should not be revised.”32 
Recently, legal reforms abroad allowing multidisciplinary 
practices and alternative business structures have prompted 
reconsideration of these issues by the Ethics Commission.33  The 
principles guiding the Commission’s deliberations are “protection 
of the public; preservation of core professional values; and 
maintenance of a strong, independent and self-regulated 
profession.”34  At its February 2011 meeting in Atlanta, the 
Commission decided that, “two options for alternative business 
structures—passive equity investment in law firms and the public 
trading of law firm interests” would not be recommended.35  When 
the Commission released its April 5, 2011 Issues Paper, it requested 
comments on just three of the five alternative business models it 
originally considered:  limited lawyer/nonlawyer partnerships 
with a cap on nonlawyer ownership; lawyer/nonlawyer 
partnerships without such a cap; and firms with lawyers and 
nonlawyers that offer both legal and non-legal services.36 
                                                     
29 Id. (quoting Report to ABA House of Delegates 10B (as revised) (1999)). 
30 Id. (discussing Report to ABA House of Delegates 117 (2000)). 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 7. 
34 Id. at 1. 
35 Id. at 2. 
36 Id. at 17–19.  The second option is currently allowed in the District of 
Columbia.  Id. at 17. 
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However, in June 2011, the Commission “eliminated further 
consideration of the third approach set out in the Issues Paper”—
multidisciplinary practices “in which lawyers offer legal services 
and nonlawyers offer other professional services to clients who 
may or may not also be using the firm’s legal services.”37  This 
decision was in line with the ABA’s consideration and strong 
rejection of the proposal to permit multidisciplinary practices back 
in 1999 and 2000.   
As a result of the February and June 2011 narrowing of possible 
options for consideration, the Commission “narrowed further 
consideration of [alternative law practice structures]” to just the 
“first two options identified in the [April 2011] Issues Paper.”38  
The two options left were:   
(1) Option B:  The approach taken by the District of 
Columbia, which permits lawyers to share legal fees 
with nonlawyers where the lawyers practice law in a 
partnership or other form of organization in which a 
financial interest is held or managerial authority is 
exercised by one or more nonlawyers who provide 
services that assist the firm in providing legal services 
to clients, under certain conditions, but without a cap 
on nonlawyer ownership; and 
(2) Option A:  A narrower version of the District of 
Columbia approach, which would permit lawyers to 
become partners with (and share fees with) 
nonlawyers . . .under narrowly defined 
circumstances.39 
This rather narrow inquiry did not result in sufficient support 
for revising the ABA rules, so the Ethics Commission “decided not 
to develop a proposal on whether nonlawyers should be allowed 
to have some form of limited ownership interest in U.S. law 
firms.”40 
Indeed, most comments to the Ethics Commission were 
negative.  Nine General Counsel for large multinational 
                                                     
37 Ethics Comm’n Discussion Draft for Cmt. of Dec. 2011, supra note 26, at 5. 
38 Id.  
39 Id. 
40 Podgers, supra note 3. 
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corporations vigorously opposed changes to Rule 5.4 on several 
grounds.41  First, there was no demonstrated need for change.42  
Second, any nonlawyer ownership of law firms would undermine 
the attorney-client relationship, especially the duty of 
confidentiality.43  Third, the General Counsel were “deeply 
troubled by a proposed change that would only further undermine 
the tradition that law is a profession rather than a business.”44  
Finally, the General Counsel expressed the view that nonlawyer 
ownership of law firms could undermine the judicial and self-
regulatory oversight of the legal profession and lead to 
government regulation.45 
Professor Thomas Morgan submitted a contrary comment, 
based on the reality that law is no longer practiced primarily by 
individuals—but rather by institutions—and therefore, the ethics 
rules of the profession are out of date.46  Therefore, the distinction 
that it is “lawful for lawyers to employ nonlawyers but not to 
become their partner if any of the services would traditionally be 
viewed as practicing law . . . is surely a distinction without a 
difference.”47  Additionally, there are three reasons why law firms 
might legitimately sell equity.  First, they have traditionally paid 
                                                     
41 See generally ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, Comments of Nine General 
Counsel on the ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20 Discussion Paper on Alternative 
Law Practice Structures (2012), [hereinafter Comments of Nine General Counsel], 
available at  http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ 
ethics_2020/ethics_20_20_comments/ninegeneralcounselcomments_alpschoiceofl
awinitialdraftproposal.authcheckdam.pdf.  
42 Id. at 2–3. 
43 Id. at 3–4.  On the issue of how confidentiality might be undermined by 
outside capital, see generally ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, Draft White Paper on 
Alternative Litigation Finance, at 32–38 (2011), available at http://www. 
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20111019_draft_
alf_white_paper_posting.authcheckdam.pdf.  
44 Comments of Nine General Counsel, supra note 41, at 4–5.  Considering the 
source, this comment is a bit rich.  General Counsel of large companies enjoy stock 
options, which has made them not too different from other corporate executives, 
and their work can sometimes become a profit center.  
45 Id. at 5–6. 
46 See generally, ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, Comments of Professor 
Thomas D. Morgan on the Discussion Paper on the Alternative Law Practice 
Structures (2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
administrative/ethics_2020/ethics_20_20_comments/morgan_alpsdiscussiondraf
t.authcheckdam.pdf.  
47 Id. at 4. 
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out profits instead of retaining earnings.  Second, selling equity 
could create a liquid market in firm shares for the benefit of 
departing partners.  Third, a more lasting institutional character for 
a modern firm could be created for “brand identity and its 
reputation for ethics and quality.”48 
Despite the decision of the Ethics Committee not to go forward 
with changes to Rule 5.4, a resolution was presented to the ABA 
House of Delegates in the summer of 2012, asking for reaffirmance 
of its stand against nonlawyer ownership of law firms.49  This issue 
came up in the context of fee-sharing arrangements between 
lawyers and nonlawyers in jurisdictions that allow nonlawyer 
investment in law firms—especially England, Australia, and 
Canada.  The Ethics Commission has requested comment on how 
to resolve conflicts of law between ethics rules in different 
jurisdictions.50  This could lead to recognition of nonlawyer 
ownership of firms where it is allowed.51  The resolution regarding 
reaffirmance of nonlawyer ownership of firms was so controversial 
that ninety-two people asked to speak for or against it, but only 
four people spoke before the House voted to postpone the 
resolution indefinitely.52  Nevertheless, this issue will not go away, 
in part because it is tied to the conflict of law issue at firms where 
there are partners from England and partners from a U.S. 
jurisdiction.53 
In August 2013, the Ethics Commission issued a formal opinion 
stating that lawyers in jurisdictions that follow Rule 5.4 “may work 
with other lawyers or law firms practicing in jurisdictions with 
rules that permit sharing legal fees with nonlawyers.”54  The 
opinion relied upon Model Rule 1.5(e), which permits lawyers 
                                                     
48 Id. at 5–6. 
49 Debra Cassens Weiss, ABA House Postpones Resolution Reaffirming 
Opposition to Nonlawyer Ownership of Law Firms, ABA JOURNAL (Aug. 6, 2012, 11:26 
AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/resolution_confirms_aba_ 
stance_against_nonlawyer_ownership_of_law_firms/. 
50 See Joan C. Rogers, Ethics 20/20 Floats Revised Proposal on Agreements for 
Choice of Conflicts Rules, BLOOMBERG BNA (Jul. 18, 2012), http://www. 
bna.com/ethics-2020-floats-n12884910736. 
51 Weiss, supra note 49 (reporting a statement made by Lawrence Fox, a 
member of the House of Delegates from Philadelphia). 
52 Id. 
53 See id. 
54 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 464, at 1 (2013). 
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working at different firms to divide legal fees in certain 
situations.55  Additionally, the August 2013 opinion cited ABA 
Formal Opinion 91–360 for the proposition that lawyers should not 
be restricted by rules in jurisdictions where they do not practice.56  
Thus, the Ethics Commission found that the Model Rules support 
fee-sharing between lawyers, where one lawyer may legally 
engage in sharing fees with nonlawyers so long as “there is no 
interference with the lawyer’s independent professional 
judgment.”57 
It would appear that the opposition by the ABA to nonlawyer 
participation in law firms, either in the form of multidisciplinary 
practices or equity investment may be driven at least as much by 
economic protectionism as a need to protect the core values of the 
profession.58  In addition, the ABA and many members of the legal 
profession are wary of threats to self-regulation.  Although 
nonlawyer participation in law firm governance could undermine 
professional judgment, is the threat of control by equity investors 
necessarily more pernicious than the threat of control by bank 
lenders?59  In-house counsels who work for corporations may claim 
that the corporation is their client, but they are nevertheless subject 
to control by their corporate employers.60  The threat to 
maintaining client confidentiality is a legitimate concern, but this 
threat is already present when lawyers work with nonlawyers in 
connection with the representation of clients.61  What the bar and 
other policy makers should consider is whether some of the 
benefits of nonlawyer involvement in law firms might outweigh 
the danger that the core values of the profession could be 
undermined, and what mechanisms could be devised to protect 
                                                     
55 Id. at 1–2. 
56 Id. at 2–3. 
57 Id. at 1. 
58 See Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlawyers in the Business of Law: Does the One 
Who Has the Gold Really Make the Rules?, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 616–17 (1989) 
(noting the fear that ruinous competition may develop if for-profit law offices are 
allowed). 
59 Id. at 608–09. 
60 Id.  It is somewhat ironic that one of the strongest comments against 
changes in the ethics rules came from general counsel from some of the largest 
corporations in the United States.  Comments of Nine General Counsel, supra note 
41, at 6–7. 
61 Andrews, supra note 58, at 615–16. 
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those core values in the face of changes to the organization of law 
firms. 
1.2.  New York Rules 
In the late 1990s, the New York State Bar Association, along 
with the ABA and other bar organizations, was considering 
whether demand for multidisciplinary practice firms should lead 
to changes in ethics rules.  As a result, the New York ethics rules 
were revised in recognition of the need for law firms sometimes to 
provide clients with non-legal services and the difficulty of 
distinguishing between legal and non-legal services in certain 
situations. 
The revised Rule 5.7 of the New York Rules of Professional 
Conduct62 envisions a firm controlled by lawyers, but requires that 
if non-legal services are provided to a client; the recipient must be 
made aware of any services not subject to the attorney-client 
relationship; the relationship shall be subject to lawyer professional 
ethics rules when the client cannot distinguish between legal and 
non-legal services; and, any nonlawyers in the firm may not affect 
a lawyer’s professional judgment or compromise a lawyer’s 
professional responsibilities.63  Another change in the rule allows a 
lawyer or law firm to enter into a contractual relationship with a 
nonlawyer professional or firm.64  This rule is stricter than the rule 
allowing nonlawyers to join a law firm and provide non-legal 
services because, among other things, it is limited to contracts with 
only five professionals:  architects, certified public accountants, 
professional engineers, surveyors, and certified social workers.65  
Neither of these rules would permit nonlawyer ownership or 
investments in a law firm. 
As will be explained below, it is now legal in  
England and some other jurisdictions for nonlawyer supervisors 
and owners to be included as principals of a law firm.  When a law 
firm asked for guidance from the New York State Bar Association 
as to whether a New York law firm could become an employee of a 
                                                     
62 N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT supra note 16, at R. 5.7 (2009), available at 
http://www.nysba.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=26646.  
63 Cone, supra note 23, at 418.  
64 N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 16, at R. 5.8.  
65 Cone, supra note 23, at 418.  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss2/4
04_KARMEL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/12/2014  3:42 PM 
2013] WILL LAW FIRMS GO PUBLIC? 499 
U.K. entity which included nonlawyers, the Committee on 
Professional Ethics responded in the negative:  “The inquiry is 
governed by Rule 5.4(a), which forbids a lawyer from sharing fees 
with a nonlawyer, and Rule 5.4(d), which forbids a lawyer from 
practicing law for profit with an entity that includes a nonlawyer 
owner or member.  These provisions would clearly be violated by 
the proposed arrangement.”66 
The Philadelphia Bar Association Professional Guidance 
Committee reached a contrary conclusion, deciding that if lawyers 
in jurisdictions outside Pennsylvania permit fee sharing with 
nonlawyers in accordance with their own bar rules, it is 
permissible for Pennsylvania lawyers to share fees with them, even 
though they cannot share fees with nonlawyers in the state.67  It is 
this conflict in the views of two important jurisdictions that led the 
ABA Ethics Committee to consider how conflict of laws should 
apply to firms which have partners from jurisdictions with 
different ethical rules.68 
1.3.  District of Columbia Bar Rules 
1.3.1. History of District of Columbia Professional Conduct Rule 5.4 
In the years that followed the ABA’s 1983 adoption of the 
Model Rules, many states adopted professional rules for their own 
jurisdictions that were similar or identical to the ABA’s Rules.  
Many states adopted the ABA’s Model Rules verbatim.  The 
District of Columbia, however, departed drastically from the trend 
of most other states69 when it considered adopting the proposed 
Rule 5.4 that had been rejected by the ABA. 
                                                     
66 N.Y. State Bar Assoc. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 911 (2012), available at 
http://www.nysba.org/CustomTemplates/Content.aspx?id=4182. 
67 Phila. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Guidance Comm., Op. 2010–7, at 3 (2010), available at 
http://www.philadelphiabar.org/WebObjects/PBAReadOnly.woa/Contents/W
ebServerResources/CMSResources/Opinion_2010-7Final.pdf. 
68 See supra notes 54–57 and accompanying text. 
69 North Dakota was the only other jurisdiction to consider adopting the 
version of Rule 5.4 rejected by the ABA.  See Bradley G. Johnson, Ready or Not, 
Here They Come: Why the ABA Should Amend the Model Rules to Accommodate 
Multidisciplinary Practices, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 951, 963–64 (2000) (describing 
North Dakota’s consideration and ultimate rejection of a proposal closely 
resembling Model Rule 5.4). 
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The D.C. Bar had come to recognize “an increasing demand for 
a broad range of professional services from a single provider.”70  
As Mark Lynch, member of the D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Committee 
(“Ethics Committee”) and author of the D.C. Bar Rule 5.4 later 
explained, “the committee perceived a market demand for one-
stop shopping—for collaborative services of lawyers with such 
other professionals as accountants, lobbyists, social workers and 
economists.”71  Dissatisfaction with Rule 3–103, which limited 
partnerships between lawyers and nonlawyers to providing non-
legal services, led Mark Lynch to advocate for a proposed change 
in the rule.72  In 1986, Chairman Robert Jordan of the Ethics 
Committee ultimately presented a proposed Rule 5.4 to the D.C. 
Board of Governors that was identical to the version rejected by the 
ABA.73  
When the proposal came before the D.C. Board of Governors in 
February of that year, several Board members expressed 
reservations about the proposed Rule, which did not originally 
include a provision that partnership be limited to the practice of 
law.74  Board member Jamie Gorelick75 was concerned with 
                                                     
70 Id. at 962.  Moreover, Washington D.C. was already “the undisputed center 
of ancillary business activity, so official acceptance of the practice there [was] 
hardly surprising.”  Marjorie Meeks, Alter[ing] People’s Perceptions: The Challenge 
Facing Advocates of Ancillary Business Practices, 66 IND. L.J. 1031, 1053 (1991). 
71 Susan Gilbert & Larry Lempert, The Nonlawyer Partner: Moderate Proposals 
Deserve a Chance, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 383, 393 (1988) (citing interview with 
Mark Lynch).  The idea of “one-stop shopping,” at least with regard to lawyers 
employing nonlawyer professionals to provide nonlawyer services to clients, was 
not an unfamiliar concept to the D.C. Bar.  In 1980, the D.C. Ethics Committee 
issued an opinion stating that “[i]t is ethically proper for a lawyer, law firm or 
professional corporation, while engaging in the practice of law, also to offer and 
furnish services of other professionals, such as (in this case) psychologists, social 
workers and family counselors.”  Id. (citing D.C. Bar Code of Prof’l Responsibility 
& Opinions of the D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 93 (1980) [hereinafter D.C. 
Bar Code and Opinions]).  Despite this opinion, D.C. Disciplinary Rule 3–103 
continued to prohibit a lawyer from having “a nonlawyer as a partner in an 
enterprise which involves the practice of law (even though it may involve other 
activities as well).”  Id. at 394. 
72 Id. at 393 n.43.  Further fueling Lynch’s suggestion was the fact that, over 
the years, the Ethics Committee “had received numerous inquiries from people 
who wanted collaborative services between lawyers and other professionals.”  Id. 
(citing Minutes of the D.C. Bar Board of Governors). 
73 Id. at 394. 
74 Proposed Rule 5.4 originally allowed lawyer/nonlawyer partnerships only 
if (1) there was no interference with the lawyer’s independence of professional 
judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; (2) the confidences and secrets of 
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whether nonlawyer partners would “recognize potential conflicts 
between clients,”76 and whether they would “give conflicts the 
same sensitive treatment that a lawyer is required to give.”77  
Gorelick also worried that if a lawyer “did not control the flow of 
information” in such an enterprise, a court might refuse to 
recognize the well-established attorney-client privilege or work-
product protection.78  In addition, Board members questioned 
whether the proposed Rule 5.4 could “adequately protect against 
acts by the nonlawyer partner which, if they were done by a 
lawyer, would violate the rules of professional conduct.”79  Board 
members noted that such protection was already in place in the 
traditional lawyer/nonlawyer employer-employee relationship.  
Ultimately, these concerns, coupled with an all-around fear that 
adoption of the Rule would “pave[] the way for conglomerates of 
lawyers and nonlawyers,” led the Jordan Committee to modify the 
Rule to limit “the activities of the partnership to the practice of 
law.”80 
Another bout of skepticism—this time through the media 
outlets—occurred after the D.C. Board of Governors submitted its 
proposed Rules of Professional Conduct to the D.C. Court of 
                                                     
the lawyer’s clients were protected as required by D.C. Bar Rule 1.6; (3) the 
arrangement did not involve advertising or personal contact with prospective 
clients by the nonlawyer, as prohibited by D.C. Bar Rule 7.1; (4) the arrangement 
did not result in charging a fee that violated D.C. Bar Rule 1.5; and (5) the 
foregoing conditions were set forth in writing.  Id. 
75 Gorelick was President of the D.C. Bar from 1992–93 and is currently on 
the Ethics Commission of the ABA.  People: Jamie Gorelick, WILMERHALE, http:// 
www.wilmerhale.com/jamie_gorelick/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2014). 
76 Gilbert & Lempert, supra note 71, at 394. 
77 Id. at 395. 
78 Id.  
79 Id.  
80 Id.  According to an interview with Chairman Jordan after the Rule’s 
adoption, the idea was “let’s try this for a while.  Let’s not fundamentally change 
the nature of the institutions providing legal services.”  Id. at 396 (quoting 
Interview by Larry Lempert with Robert Jordan, Chairman, Jordan Comm’n for 
the D.C. Bar (Dec. 1, 1987)).  President-elect of the D.C. Bar at the time, Paul 
Friedman, expressed reservations similar to those of Chairman Jordan and other 
Board members.  During a later interview with Friedman, he said “[y]ou don’t 
want a law firm with twenty partners, eleven of them economists.  Then it’s no 
longer a law firm[.]”  Id. (quoting Interview by Larry Lempert with Paul 
Friedman, President-elect of the D.C. Bar (Feb. 12, 1988)).  According to Friedman, 
law firms should not be managed by “people without knowledge of and 
commitment to the ethics rules [binding on lawyers].”  Id. 
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Appeals in November 1986.  The National Law Journal and Business 
Week both released articles in January of 1987 discussing the so-
called “Fear of Sears.”  This was part of the same sentiment that 
had doomed the proposed Rule 5.4 in the ABA House of Delegates, 
which involved an overwhelming fear that the Bar Association 
rules could allow firms eventually to go public “pav[ing] the way 
for such retailers as Sears, Roebuck & Co. to add legal counseling 
to their array of services.”81 
In the end, the D.C. Court of Appeals approved the D.C. Rule 
with the added clarification that “[a] lawyer may practice law in a 
partnership . . . in which a financial interest or managerial 
authority is exercised by an individual nonlawyer who performs 
professional services which assist the organization in providing legal 
services to clients.”82  In addition, the Court of Appeals added 
several comments to the Rule describing the types of 
lawyer/nonlawyer partnerships the D.C. Bar had in mind.  These 
partnerships included those between economists and antitrust 
lawyers, CPAs and tax attorneys, and psychologists and family law 
practitioners.  The additional comments “banish[ed] the Sears, 
Roebuck specter” once and for all, and final adoption of the rule 
occurred on March 1, 1990.83 
                                                     
81 Id. at 398.  See Paula Dwyer, Soon Anybody May Be Able to Own a Law Firm, 
BUS. WK., Jan. 26, 1987, at 42 (explaining how such rules would allow nonlawyers 
to own law firms); David A. Kaplan, Ethics Change in Works: Want to Invest in a Law 
Firm?, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 19, 1987, at 1 (documenting proposed rules in Washington, 
D.C. and North Dakota that would allow substantial layperson involvement in 
law firms).  This outcry from the media caused the Jordan Committee to submit a 
supplementary petition to the D.C. Court of Appeals, the highest court in the 
District of Columbia, clarifying the proposed Rule 5.4.  Adams & Matheson, supra 
note 25, at 12.  The petition stated that “[t]here was no thought that proposed Rule 
5.4 should permit any organization or entity to effectively acquire and control a 
law firm.”  Id. (quoting Supplementary Petition of the Bd. of Governors of the 
D.C. Bar Regarding the Adoption of Rules of Prof’l Conduct and Related 
Comments, at 4–5 (Sept. 11, 1987)).  According to Chairman Jordan, the purpose 
“was to permit nonlawyer professionals to practice their professional skills in 
cooperation with lawyers in a firm limited to delivering legal services.”  Gilbert & 
Lempert, supra note 71, at 399 (quoting Memorandum of Robert Jordan, 
Chairman, Jordan Comm’n for the D.C. Bar, to the D.C. Court of Appeals 63 (Mar. 
4, 1987)). 
82 Gilbert & Lempert, supra note 71, at 399 (emphasis in original). 
83 Id. at 399–400. 
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1.3.2. Effects of Professional Conduct D.C. Bar Rule 5.4 Since Its 
Adoption in 1991 
In a “Report and Recommendation” issued in the late 1990s, 
the District of Columbia Bar Special Committee on 
Multidisciplinary Practice reviewed the effects of Rule 5.4 since the 
rule’s adoption: 
Nearly a decade of experience under the 1991 version of 
Rule 5.4 has produced no evidence in the District of 
Columbia that lawyers are unable to honor their 
professional obligations when they offer legal services 
within the framework of organizations in which 
nonlawyers hold an ownership interest or exercise 
managerial authority.84 
In addition, no disciplinary action under D.C. Rule 5.4(b) has 
been taken against any lawyer of the D.C. Bar since it became 
effective in 1991.85 
Despite the seeming freedom granted to lawyers in D.C. who 
wish to form partnerships with nonlawyers, many law firms in 
D.C. have never taken advantage of Rule 5.4.  The rule’s limiting 
condition requiring such partnerships to provide legal services as 
their sole purpose has proven to be a “major stumbling block.”86  
The scope of the rule was even further limited when the D.C. Bar 
adopted ABA Ethics Committee Formal Opinion 91–360, issued in 
July 1991, which prohibits multi-jurisdictional law firms from 
having nonlawyer partners in their D.C. office.87 
                                                     
84 D.C. Bar Special Comm. on Multidisciplinary Prac., Proposed Rule 5.4: 
Professional Independence of a Lawyer: Note on History of the Rule (1999). 
85 Laurel S. Terry, A Primer on MDPS: Should the “No” Rule Become a New 
Rule?, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 869, 875 (1999) (citing Testimony of D.C. Ethics Counsel 
Susan Gilbert (Nov. 12, 1998)). 
86 Mary C. Daly, Choosing Wise Men Wisely: The Risks and Rewards of 
Purchasing Legal Services From Lawyers in a Multidisciplinary Partnership, 13 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 217, 244 (2000). 
87 Terry, supra note 85, at 875.  As such, even multi-state law firms that wish 
to take advantage of Rule 5.4 are inevitably prevented from doing so and the 
availability of the rule is left to “D.C.-based boutique law firms that identify a 
specific need (i.e., the need for an accountant to do tax work or the need for an 
office manager).”  Id. 
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1.3.3. Consulting Subsidiaries of Arnold & Porter LLP 
Some of the impetus for the change in the rules of the D.C. Bar 
came from Arnold & Porter LLP, which experimented with mixing 
the practice of law with other professional services through 
ownership of three consulting firm subsidiaries.  None of these 
ventures proved permanent, however.  The first, APCO Associates 
Inc., was created in 1984 as a wholly owned subsidiary of Arnold & 
Porter LLP.  APCO began as a multidisciplinary practice that dealt 
with public affairs, government relations, and strategic 
communications.88  APCO was eventually sold in 1991 to Grey 
Advertising.  On September 24, 2004, APCO announced that its 
management concluded a buyout from Grey Global, making it 
“one of the largest privately owned consulting firms in the public 
affairs and strategic communications industry.”89 
Around the same time Arnold & Porter opened APCO, it 
formed another subsidiary called MPC & Associates.  MPC was a 
real estate development consulting firm “that worked primarily 
with colleges, universities, and other large nonprofit institutions on 
major real estate projects.”90  MPC evolved because of the 
“extensive work” Arnold & Porter had already been doing in its 
representation of non-profit institutional clients for which the firm 
was “retained to deal with exceedingly complex, sprawling real 
                                                     
88 James W. Jones, Vice Chairman and General Counsel, APCO Assocs., 
Statement to the Center for Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Assoc. 
(Feb. 6, 1999),  available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_ 
responsibility/commission_multidisciplinary_practice/jones1.html [hereinafter 
Jones Statement].  According to Jones, who served as Vice-Chairman and General 
Counsel of APCO, 
APCO was conceived as a vehicle for broadening the scope of services 
offered by Arnold & Porter to its clients and as a means for offering 
services in a more efficient and cost-effective manner.  It grew out of the 
conviction that—at least for certain types of matters—an 
interdisciplinary approach combining the skills of lawyers and 
nonlawyer professionals could lead to better and more creative solutions 
for client problems.   
Id.   
89 Press Release, APCO Worldwide and Grey Global Grp., Inc., APCO 
Completes Transaction for Management Buyout (Sept. 28, 2004) (on file with 
author). 
90 Jones Statement, supra note 88.  
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estate projects.”91  MPC was eventually sold to Sallie Mae, but 
scant information about the sale is publicly available. 
Arnold & Porter also opened a financial industry consulting 
firm called The Secura Group in 1987.  The Group served 
commercial banks and thrift institutions, as well as investors of 
those entities.  The Secura Group was created to complement 
Arnold & Porter’s large bank regulatory practice, and in 1989, 
James F. Fitzpatrick of Arnold & Porter said in an address: “[t]here 
is great synergism between our bank regulatory practice and 
Secura.  There is a significant overlap in client base, and one group 
helps spin off business for the other.”92  Fitzpatrick noted at the 
time, however, that “particular attention must be paid to the 
ethical requirements that clients requesting non-legal services have 
full opportunity to go wherever they want for the legal component 
of those services.”93  The Secura Group eventually purchased 
Arnold & Porter’s interest in the Group in 1993, and it is no longer 
a subsidiary of Arnold & Porter.94 
When Vice Chairman and General Counsel of APCO James 
Jones made his statement to the ABA Commission on 
Multidisciplinary Practice on February 6, 1999, he said that when 
Arnold & Porter created their subsidiaries, the “impact of the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct on their structure and operations 
was far from clear.”95  Thus, in order to ensure that the subsidiaries 
did not run afoul of the ABA professional ethics rules, Arnold & 
Porter put several elements into place.  For example, Arnold & 
Porter required that all promotional literature and retainer 
agreements disclose the fact that the consulting firms were 
subsidiaries of Arnold & Porter, and that the consulting clients 
were under no obligation to use Arnold & Porter’s legal services.  
The promotional materials also had to be pre-approved by Arnold 
& Porter’s ethics committee “using principles consistent with those 
applicable in the legal profession.”96  Arnold & Porter also held 
                                                     
91 James F. Fitzpatrick, Legal Future Shock: The Role of Large Law Firms by the 
End of the Century, 64 IND. L.J. 461, 470 (1989). 
92 Id. at 468. 
93 Id. 
94 Jim McTague, Secura Forms Alliance with Andersen, AM. BANKER, Jan. 18, 
1994, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-14919203.html. 
95 Jones Statement, supra note 88, at 2.  
96 Id.  
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each subsidiary to “the same ethical requirements—in terms of 
conflicts of interest, protection of client confidences, advertising of 
services, etc.—that applied to the law firm itself.”97  In addition, 
any questions concerning these issues were “required to be 
resolved by the firm’s ethics committee and not by the subsidiary 
company.”98 
1.4.  Threats to the Rules 
Even if bar associations do not alter traditional ethics rules 
prohibiting multidisciplinary firms or ownership of interests in law 
firms by nonlawyers, the financing of law firms is likely to change 
either due to international competition (which will be discussed 
below), changing business practices on the ground, or as a result of 
lawsuits challenging the ethics rules.  Competition from other 
professionals is also a factor in the changing complexion of the 
legal services industry.  Although accounting and consulting firms 
eschew the idea that they are providing legal advice, the line 
between such services is often a line in the sand.  This is 
particularly true because of the emphasis on compliance, corporate 
governance, and risk management systems in financial and other 
businesses.  Further, it has long been true with regard to tax law 
practice.99 
Prior to 2002, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) did not stop accounting firms from providing consulting 
services to their audit clients, although arguably it could have done 
so.  Although the SEC was empowered to define “independence” 
in terms of the filing and certification of financial statements by 
independent auditors, Congress had not given the SEC the specific 
authority to regulate auditing standards.100  Early attempts by the 
SEC to place limits on accounting firms’ ability to provide 
consulting services to audit clients were unsuccessful because of 
“contentious arguments between [the then-]Big Five accounting 
firms and the SEC.”101 
                                                     
97 Id.  
98 Id.  
99 Andrews, supra note 58, at 632–36.  
100 Robert J. Anello, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Wake Up Call to Attorneys, 22 PENN ST. 
INT’L L. REV. 545, 552 (2003–04). 
101 Id.  
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After the fall of Enron and a number of other corporate and 
accounting scandals in 2001, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley),102 which created new and enhanced 
standards for the accounting profession.  In addition to creating the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and 
granting it the power to establish rules and regulations governing 
the accounting profession, Sarbanes-Oxley granted the SEC the 
authority to adopt its own rules to “expand the requirements of 
auditor independence.”103  Section 201(a) of Sarbanes-Oxley104 
effectively put an end to the multidisciplinary practices “that had 
been cultivated by the Big Five accounting firms” prior to 2002.105  
This provision makes it unlawful for a registered public accounting 
firm that is performing an audit for an issuer to 
contemporaneously provide certain non-audit services, including 
legal services.106  Although the list of non-audit services is 
extensive, it does not prohibit the contemporaneous performance 
of tax consulting services so long as pre-approval is received from 
the issuer’s accounting board.  In addition, the PCAOB may add to 
the list of prohibited services “any other service that the Board 
determines, by regulation, is impermissible.”107 
Though accounting firms are limited in their ability to provide 
consulting services to audit clients, they can provide these services 
to other clients; thus, big accounting firms have developed 
sophisticated consulting practices. Independent consulting 
organizations have done so as well.  For example, Deloitte, one of 
the Big Four accounting firms, has an affiliated subsidiary called 
Deloitte Financial Advisory Services LLP that advises clients on a 
variety of matters that overlap with the advice given by business 
                                                     
102 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 
18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.). 
103 Anello, supra note 100, at 555. 
104 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g) (2012).  
105 Anello, supra note 100, at 561. 
106 Sarbanes-Oxley prohibits auditors from performing non-audit services for 
their clients, including (1) bookkeeping or other services related to the accounting 
records or financial statements of the audit client; (2) financial information 
systems design and implementation; (3) appraisal or valuation services, fairness 
opinions, or contribution-in-kind reports; (4) actuarial services; (5) internal audit 
outsourcing services; (6) management functions or human resources; (7) broker or 
dealer, investment adviser, or investment banking services; and (8) legal services 
and expert services unrelated to the audit.  15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g) (2012).  
107 Id. 
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lawyers.  To that end, its services include managing business 
controversies and disputes, executing deals, and maintaining 
regulatory compliance.108  In addition, Deloitte advertises to hire 
legal services employees in corporate law, corporate governance, 
corporate reorganizations, private equity, venture capital, and 
other categories that overlap with services provided to clients by 
law firms.109  Likewise, Accenture, a publicly traded consulting 
firm that spun off from Arthur Anderson, another large accounting 
firm, advertises for its Legal Services Group.110 
These activities do not mean that Deloitte or Accenture are 
engaging in the illegal practice of law, but rather that legal services 
are not confined to the courtroom, and the giving of legal advice in 
connection with business transactions and compliance matters is 
difficult to distinguish from management consulting.  Even in 
litigation, consulting organizations provide legal as well as other 
professional experts.111  These services overlap with the services 
provided by business lawyers, and law firms experiencing 
economic stress may decide they should be competing with 
accountants and consultants in advising corporations and other 
businesses.  This was the pressure that led to changes in the ethics 
rules of the D.C. bar a number of years ago. 
Outsourcing of legal work to lawyers and nonlawyers and the 
utilization of nonlawyers with regard to the work of large law 
firms have raised some questions about nonlawyer participation in 
the provision of legal services and its impact on ethical rules.  
These issues were addressed by the Ethics Commission and 
resulted in some minor modifications to Rules 1.1 Competence, 5.3 
Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistance, and 5.5 
Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multijurisdictional Practice of Law.  
                                                     
108 Learn More: Financial Advisory Services, DELOITTE, 
http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_US/us/Services/Financial-Advisory-
Services/a27e4bdacd0fb110VgnVCM100000ba42f00aRCRD.htm (last visited July 
22, 2013).  
109 Legal Services, DELOITTE, http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_GX/global/ 
services/deloitte-legal/index.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2012). 
110 Legal & Commercial Services, Talent Segments, ACCENTURE, http:// 
careers.accenture.com/us-en/your-future/career-paths/Pages/index.aspx (last 
visited Sept. 9, 2012). 
111 See, e.g., ROUND TABLE GROUP, http://www.roundtablegroup.com (last 
visited Nov. 13, 2013) (providing an example of a consulting firm that provides 
legal and other professional services). 
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The Ethics Committee suggested only minor changes in the rules, 
but it submitted an interesting report on outsourcing.112  The report 
emphasized appropriate supervision and the ban on assisting in 
the unauthorized practice of law. 
The widespread use of temporary lawyers from agencies and 
the outsourcing of legal work can be justified under ethics rules 
because law firm partners supervise these independent contractors.  
But what is the justification when the independent contractors 
combine to provide legal services directly to clients?  A very 
interesting example of such a firm is Axiom Global, Inc. (Axiom), a 
long-term legal placement agency with 450 temporary attorneys.  
Although it began by supplying lawyers to the financial services 
industry, it changed its business model after 2008 and now does 
outsourcing work for large corporations such as Hewlett-Packard 
Co., Kraft Foods, and Vodaphone.  Some of the legal work for these 
businesses was formerly done in house.  “Since its inception, 
Axiom has been the beneficiary of more than $30 million in venture 
capital.”113  Because it is a corporation with nonlawyer investors, it 
is limited by the rules of ethics so that it is unable to render legal 
opinions, represent a client in court, take a company public, or lead 
a major corporate transaction.114  Nevertheless, Axiom is 
competing directly with business lawyers and is being financed by 
nonlawyers.  Axiom’s business model could possibly be defended 
pursuant to cases upholding pre-paid group legal services or the 
right of non-profit groups to provide services to their members.115 
Another development that is undermining current ethics rules 
is the financing of claims and contingency fees in plaintiff side 
                                                     
112 ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, House of Delegate Resolution 105C 
Adopted—Amends the Comments to Model Rules 1.1, 5.3, and 5.5 (2012) (on file 
with author.)  
113 Drew Combs, Disruptive Innovation, AM. LAW., July/Aug. 2012, at 1, 
available at http://www.axiomlaw.com/Images/Attorneys/0010811201Axim.pdf.  
See also LEGALZOOM.COM (last visited Mar. 4, 2014) (advertising the provision of 
some legal services, such as wills, over the Internet).  
114 Id.  See also Daniel Fisher, New Precedent for Law Firms, FORBES (June 8, 
2011, 6:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2011/0627/entrepreneurs-mark-
harris-axiom-law-moving-target.html (describing Axiom’s business model of 
providing temporary attorney placement). 
115 See Andrews, supra note 58, at 636–40 (describing extensive nonlawyer 
involvement in prepaid group legal services, supported by U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions upholding the rights of nonprofit groups to provide legal services. Note 
that Axiom is an openly for-profit corporation). 
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lawsuits.  Banks, hedge funds, and private investors are 
bankrolling lawsuits with loans that have high interest rates.  If the 
case is successful, the loans are repaid out of the proceeds of the 
recovery.116  Although these investments are loans rather than 
equity, so they do not directly contravene ethical prohibitions 
against nonlawyer investments in law firms, questions have been 
raised about investor control of the lawsuits and whether the duty 
of confidentiality has been breached.117 
Litigation attacking current ethics rules is underway and under 
contemplation.  This litigation will be discussed below.  Although 
this litigation has been premised on constitutional grounds, it is 
unclear what constitutional rights are impinged upon by the rules 
preventing nonlawyer investment in law firms or multidisciplinary 
practices.118  Yet, a very interesting article has argued that 
preventing corporations from owning law firms violates the First 
Amendment.119  Another possible attack on the prohibitions of 
equity investment in law firms by nonlawyers is under the 
antitrust laws. 
In view of the deregulation of other industries, specifically 
investment banking and stock exchanges, which will be discussed 
below, and the rationale for reforms in the England, Australia, and 
Canada, challenges under the antitrust laws may also be made, but 
such challenges face substantial problems because of the 
involvement of the courts in lawyer regulation. 
                                                     
116 Binyamin Appelbaum, Investors Put Money on Lawsuits to Get Payouts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 14, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/15/business/ 
15lawsuit.html?pagewanted=all;  Lisa Rickard, Why are Hedge Funds Allowed to 
Invest in Litigation?, THE ATLANTIC (July 3, 2012, 1:42 PM), http://www. 
theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/07/why-are-hedge-funds-allowed-to-
invest-in-litigation/259345/. 
117 Id. 
118 See Jacoby & Meyers, LLP v. The Presiding Justices of the Appellate Div., 
847 F. Supp. 2d 590 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (ruling that Jacoby & Meyers, LLP and an 
affiliate lacked standing to seek a declaration that N.Y. R. Prof. Conduct 5.4 (22 
NYCRR 1200.0), which prohibited nonlawyer equity investment in law practices, 
was unconstitutional). 
119 Knake, supra note 19. 
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2. REGULATION OF LAWYERS ABROAD 
2.1.  In England and Wales 
 The Legal Services Act of 2007 (LS Act)120 reformed the 
regulation of lawyers in the England and Wales to encourage 
competition and deal with consumer complaints.  The LS Act 
provides for the creation of alternative business structures (ABS) 
for law firms permitting lawyers and nonlawyers to work together, 
and allowing for external investment in firms.  The predicate for 
this reform was a December 2004 Report by Sir David Clementi 
(Clementi Report)121 commissioned “[t]o consider what regulatory 
framework would best promote competition, innovation and the 
public and consumer interest in an efficient, effective and 
independent legal sector.”122  Sir Clementi was also instructed to 
recommend a new framework for the regulation of the legal 
profession pursuant to a reformed structure.  This commission 
resulted from a report by the Department for Constitutional Affairs 
that had reached the conclusion that the English regulatory 
framework for lawyers was “outdated, inflexible, over-complex 
and insufficiently accountable or transparent.”123 
There are two premises that underlay the Clementi Report and 
the LS Act that stand in the way of similar reform by the ABA.  The 
first premise is a rejection of the idea that the roles of lawyers as 
professionals and as business people conflict.  According to Sir 
Clementi, “[a]ccess to justice requires not only that the legal advice 
given is sound, but also the presence of business skills necessary to 
provide a cost-effective service in a consumer-friendly way.”124  
The second premise is a rejection of self-regulation that lacks 
significant government oversight and has no nonlawyer 
involvement. 
                                                     
120 Legal Services Act, 2007, c. 29 (U.K.) [hereinafter Legal Services Act], 
available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/29/pdfs/ukpga_20070029_en.pdf . 
121 SIR DAVID CLEMENTI, REVIEW OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR LEGAL 
SERVICES IN ENGLAND AND WALES: FINAL REPORT (2004) [hereinafter CLEMENTI 
REPORT]. 
122 Id. at 1. 
123 Id.  (internal citations omitted).  
124 Id. at 5. 
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The Clementi Report comes to a number of important 
conclusions regarding multi-disciplinary practices and outside 
ownership of such firms.  It concludes that outside ownership of 
law firms should be permitted.  Sir Clementi expressed the view 
that “[s]uch ownership should be subject to a ‘fit to own’ test; but 
the main focus of the regulatory authorities should be upon the 
identity of the management team.”125  This type of ownership was 
already permitted with regard to conveyancing services, and the 
Report proposed that “subject to proper safeguards . . . it should 
now be permitted in other areas of the legal services market.”126 
The Report was more equivocal on the subject of multi-
disciplinary practices “which bring together lawyers and other 
professionals to provide legal and other services to third 
parties.”127  It recognized that there were many issues to be 
resolved before such practices could be permitted and regulated, 
but it suggested that a new regulatory system would be a step on 
the way to allowing multi-disciplinary practices. 
The LS Act implemented the Clementi Report by establishing 
the Legal Services Board (LSB) and Office for Legal Complaints 
(OLC) for the regulation of lawyers, enabling firms to explore new 
ways of organizing their legal businesses.  The LSB was designed 
to provide proportionate, independent oversight, while approved 
regulators, such as the Law Society, The General Council of the 
Bar, and councils for specialists such as conveyancers, have 
responsibility for day-to-day regulation.  Although this is a 
continuation of the self-regulation of lawyers, the LSB differs 
because it is a government body overseeing the self-regulatory 
organizations.  The LSB Chairman and non-executive Board 
members are appointed by the Lord Chancellor in consultation 
with the Chief Justice.  The LSB is accountable to Parliament 
through the Lord Chancellor and the Ministry of Justice.128 
The LS Act provides for the licensing of new business 
structures or ABSs.  An ABS is a firm in which a nonlawyer is a 
                                                     
125 Id. at 138.  
126 Id. at 139. 
127 Id. 
128 Ministry of Justice, Framework Doc.: Agreement between Ministry of 
Justice and Legal Servs. Bd., June 2011, at 8, available at http://www. 
legalservicesboard.org.uk/about_us/lsb_framework_document/pdf/moj_frame
work_agreement_june_2011.pdf. 
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manager of the firm or has an ownership interest in the firm.  Also, 
an ABS is a firm where another body is a manager of the firm or 
has an ownership interest in the firm.  A nonlawyer is a person 
who is not authorized to carry out “reserved legal activities.”129  In 
order for a firm to become an ABS, it must be approved by a 
licensing authority such as the LSB or a day-to-day self-regulatory 
organization.130 
A licensed body must have a Head of Legal Practice who is a 
lawyer, and is responsible for ensuring that the firm and its 
lawyers comply with duties imposed by the licensing authority 
and the LS Act.131  A licensed body must also have a Head of 
Finance and Administration who is responsible for ensuring that 
the firm complies with rules made by a licensing body regarding 
accounts.132  Further, a licensed body must have arrangements in 
place to ensure that lawyers comply with “professional 
principles.”133  These principles require authorized persons to act 
with independence and integrity; to maintain proper work 
standards; to act in the best interests of their clients; to comply with 
their duties to a court to act with independence in the interests of 
justice; and to keep their clients’ affairs confidential.134  The 
licensing authority must approve each nonlawyer’s holding of ten 
percent or more of shares in a firm, even if the shares are publicly 
traded.135  Such a holder must be a “fit and proper” person and 
may not compromise regulatory objectives or the firm’s ability to 
fulfill duties imposed by the licensing authority.136 
The Law Society has set forth the potential benefits and risks of 
becoming an ABS.137  Advantages include the ability to raise equity 
                                                     
129 See Legal Services Act, supra note 120, at pt. 3, § 12 (defining “’reserved 
legal activity’” to include: “(a) the exercise of a right of audience; (b) the conduct 
of litigation;  (c) reserved instrument activities; (d) probate activities; (e) notarial 
activities; [and] (f) the administration of oaths.”).  
130 Id. at pt. 5, § 73. 
131 Id. at pt. 5, § 91.  
132 Id. at pt. 5, § 92. 
133 Id. at pt. 3, § 17. 
134 Id. at pt. 1, § 1. 
135 Id. at sched. 13, pt. 1. 
136 Id.  
137 Alternative Business Structures Practice Note, THE LAW SOCIETY (May 4, 
2011), http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/Advice/Practice-notes/Archive/ 
Alternative-business-structures/4-May-2011/.  
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from a broader base of potential persons, including non-solicitor 
employees.138  Further, equity can be raised from outside the legal 
sector without the need for nonlawyer involvement at the 
management level so that a wider range of services to clients can 
be provided than by a traditional law firm.139  Balanced against 
these advantages are potential risks to the firm’s culture.140  Also, 
many foreign jurisdictions may not accept the ABS model and the 
firm may be inhibited in providing services through an overseas 
office.141  The level of control of an outside investment and whether 
such control could interfere with the firm’s ability to act in its 
clients’ best interests needs to be considered.142  Although ABS 
firms are not limited in the services they can provide, an ABS firm 
needs to consider whether offering certain services, such as 
auditing, might conflict with a duty of confidentiality.143  One of 
the fears that lawyers express regarding nonlawyer investment in 
law firms is that large corporations could own law firms.  Such a 
development has happened in England, where London-based 
WHSmith stores are hosting legal kiosks through a partnership 
with QualitySolicitors.  Londoners can therefore obtain routine 
legal assistance where they buy stationery supplies and 
newspapers, in such matters as divorces, wills and real estate 
transactions.144 
2.2.  In Australia 
 Australia’s reform of the legal profession preceded the 
England’s reform.  The Legal Profession Act of 2004 authorized 
law firms to incorporate, and also to obtain investments from 
nonlawyers.145  Although each state in Australia has its own law 
regarding the regulation of lawyers, all have adopted the New 
South Wales legislation for “incorporated legal practices” (ILP) 
                                                     
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Id.  
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Knake, supra note 19, at 7. 
145 Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) (Austl.) [hereinafter Legal Profession Act 
2004], available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/lpa 
2004179/. 
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based on the Model Laws for the Legal Profession promulgated by 
the Law Council of Australia in 2004.  This development occurred 
primarily to increase competition for legal services and secondarily 
to create a law-firm structure that would enable partners to have 
limited liability. 146 
The Australian government was interested in applying 
competition policy to the legal services industry in order to make 
the Australian capital markets attractive in a global economy.147  
The legal profession was interested in obtaining limited liability for 
lawyers and an ability to do business in a governance form that 
would be more flexible than a traditional general partnership.148  
The Australian reform therefore permitted law firms to do business 
as multi-disciplinary partnerships, as corporations, and even go 
public.  In May 2007, Slater & Gordon, an Australian personal 
injury litigation law firm, became the first law firm in the world to 
make a public offering and then it listed on the Australian stock 
exchange (ASX).149 
Opponents of the Australian law reform were concerned about 
threats to attorneys’ ethical duties, especially the duties of 
confidentiality, privilege, independence, and competence.150  These 
concerns are addressed in the Legal Profession Act.  An ILP may 
provide legal and other lawful services, have external investors, 
and list on the ASX.151  Prior to providing legal services, an ILP 
must give written notice to the Law Society of its intention to do 
so.152  Additionally, an ILP must comply with the Australian 
Federal Corporations Act, and must register with the Australian 
                                                     
146 Justin D. Petzold, Comment, Firm Offers: Are Publicly Traded Law Firms 
Abroad Indicative of the Future of the United States Legal Sector?, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 67, 
75–76 (2009).  
147 Id.  
148 Id. at 76. 
149 Peter Lattman, Slater & Gordon: The World’s First Publicly Traded Law Firm, 
WALL ST. J. (May 22, 2007, 9:19 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/ 
05/22/slater-gordon-the-worlds-first-publicly-traded-law-firm.  
150 Petzold, supra note 146, at 78. 
151 ABA  Comm’n on Ethics 20/20 Working Group on Alternative Business 
Structures, Request for Comment: Issues Paper Concerning Alternative Business 
Structures, at 9 (2011) [hereinafter ABA Comm’n on Ethics Request for Cmt of 
Apr. 2011], available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
administrative/ethics_2020/abs_issues_paper.authcheckdam.pdf.  
152 Legal Profession Act 2004, supra note 145, § 137.  
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Securities & Investment Commission.153  An ILP must appoint at 
least one legal practitioner who must ensure that appropriate 
management systems are implemented and maintained, allowing 
the ILP to provide legal services in accordance with the 
professional obligations of legal practitioners.154  Although an 
incorporated legal practice may engage in non-legal businesses, 
where there are conflicts of interest between legal practitioners and 
others, the duties of the lawyers trump the interests of third 
parties.155 
The Slater & Gordon prospectus discusses the firm’s regulation 
and how it would deal with conflicts of interest.  First, it sets forth 
its principles of corporate governance as:  “fulfilling Slater & 
Gordon’s duties to the Court and to [its] clients; providing 
meaningful employment for employees; providing services of 
value to clients; and generating rewards for Shareholders, in a way 
that contributes to the welfare of the community.”156  Then, the 
prospectus explains that if there is a conflict of interest between 
those duties, resolution of the conflict will be as follows:  “the duty 
to the Court will prevail over all other duties; and the duty to the 
client will prevail over the Company’s other corporate 
responsibilities and duty to shareholders.”157  Because the ASX 
recommends that a majority of the board of a listed company 
should be independent directors, the Slater & Gordon board is not 
composed of its lawyer-shareholders, and under Australian 
regulations pertaining to incorporated law firms, only one director 
need be a legal practitioner.  Slater & Gordon seems to have 
prospered as a publicly traded law firm, and in January 2012, it 
                                                     
153 ABA Comm’n on Ethics Request for Cmt. of Apr. 2011, supra note 151, at 
9. 
154 Id.  
155 Id.  
156 SLATER & GORDON LTD., SLATER & GORDON PROSPECTUS § 4.3, 36 (2007), 
available at http://www.slatergordon.com.au/files/editor_upload/File/ 
prospectus/Prospectus.pdf. 
157 Id.  See also Andrew Grech & Kirsten Morrison, Slater & Gordon: The Listing 
Experience, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 535 (2009) (illustrating the ethical and practical 
issues that were considered as Slater & Gordon became the first law firm to list its 
entire practice on the Australian Stock Exchange). 
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purchased the U.K. firm of Russell Jones & Walker and entered the 
U.K. legal services market.158 
2.3.  In Canada 
In Canada, certain regulations adopted in three provinces allow 
for modified forms of MDP.  Two common law provinces, Ontario 
and British Columbia, have adopted regulations that permit MDPs, 
but with significant restrictions.159  Quebec, which is a civil law 
jurisdiction, has adopted a more liberal MDP regime.160  However, 
none of these provinces currently allow for nonlawyer ownership 
of law firms. 
2.3.1. The Canadian Bar Association and the Debate over MDPs in 
Canada 
In Canada, governance of the legal profession lies within the 
provincial Law Societies acting under statute.161  While the 
Canadian Bar Association (CBA) does not regulate the practice of 
law, like the ABA, it plays a significant role in developing the 
codes of professional conduct.162  In 1997, the CBA established its 
International Practice of Law (IPL) Committee to monitor the 
“activities, negotiations and developments regarding the 
globalization of legal practice and the trend towards multi-
disciplinary practices through NAFTA, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), and the International Bar Association.”163  
The IPL’s position on MDPs reversed course three times in a short 
period.  First, in 1998 the IPL recommended that “MDPs should 
                                                     
158 Slater & Gordon to Enter UK Market With £54m Purchase of Russell Jones & 
Walker, LEGAL FUTURES (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.legalfutures.co./latest-
news/slater-gordon-to-enter-uk-market-with-54m-purchase-of-russell-jones-
walker.  This combination was approved on April 27, 2012 by the Solicitors 
Regulation.  Michael Cross, Russell Jones & Walker Approved as ABS, THE LAW 
SOCIETY GAZETTE (April 27, 2012), http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/65363.article. 
159 ABA Comm’n on Ethics Request for Cmt of Apr. 2011, supra note 151, at 
11. 
160 Id.  
161 Paul D. Paton, Multidisciplinary Practice Redux: Globalization, Core Values, 
and Reviving the MDP Debate in America, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2193, 2203 (2010).  
162 Id. (citing About the Canadian Bar Association, CAN. BAR ASS’N 
http://www.cba.org/CBA/about/main). 
163 Id. at 2212 (citing Can. Bar Ass’n, Special Comm. On the Int’l Practice of 
Law, Multi-Disciplinary Practices: An Interim Report, at ic (1998)).  
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not be permitted to provide legal services to clients” unless they 
were controlled by lawyers.164  However, in August 2000, the IPL 
changed its position and the CBA Council approved a “final” 
resolution165 that permitted lawyers to engage in “business 
arrangements in which individuals with different professional 
qualifications practise together . . . to combine different skills to 
provide a broad range of advice to consumers.”166  This resolution 
allowed lawyers to participate in MDPs even if such MDPs were 
not controlled by lawyers.167  Additionally, the resolution did not 
limit the services that MDPs could provide to services of a legal 
nature.168  Then, in a “stark reversal,” in February 2001, the CBA 
Council “clarified” its earlier resolution with a further resolution 
that restricted the MDP regime by requiring that lawyers have 
“effective control over the MDP.”169  The CBA Council provided 
that effective control would ensure that MDPs would be in 
“continuing compliance with the core values, ethical and statutory 
obligations, standards and rules of professional conduct of the 
legal profession.”170 
The CBA’s final position seems to have been the product of 
“political intrigue and overt manipulation” by the Law Society of 
Upper Canada (LSUC), which is the provincial regulator of 
Ontario.171  This is because LSUC had already adopted an MDP 
regime significantly more restrictive than the CBA’s initial 
position.172  Thus, 
when it became clear that [LSUC] would be embarrassed by 
having the Canadian Bar Association sanction a far more 
liberal regime for MDPs than the one that LSUC had 
                                                     
164 Id.  
165 Can. Bar Ass’n, Council Res. 00-03-A (2000).  
166 Can. Bar Ass’n, Int’l Practice of Law Comm., Striking a Balance: The 
Report of the International Practice of Law Committee on Multi-Disciplinary 
Practices and the Legal Profession, at 11 (1999).  
167 Paton, supra note 161, at 2213.  
168 Id.   
169 Can. Bar Ass’n, Council Res. 00-01-M, para. 1.a (2000). 
170 Id.  
171 Paton, supra note 161, at 2211.  
172 See Law Soc’y of Upper Can., By-Law No. 25 (1999) [hereinafter By-Law 
No. 25], available at http://www.lsuc.on.ca/WorkArea/DownloadAsset. 
aspx?id=2147485895 (describing the by-law behind multi-discipline practices and 
partnerships). 
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already imposed while purportedly acting ‘in the public 
interest,’ LSUC representatives embarked on an ultimately 
successful campaign through the legal press and at the CBA 
itself to have the will of the CBA national counsel reversed 
and a narrower MDP regime with a lawyer-control 
requirement adopted.173 
2.3.2. Ontario 
MDPs have been permitted in Ontario since LSUC adopted By-
Law 25 on April 30, 1999.174  This regulation exists today, in much 
its same form, under By-Law 7.175  Part III of By-Law 7 sets forth 
the rules governing MDPs in Ontario.  A lawyer (licensee) can 
form a partnership or other association (but not a corporation) with 
a nonlawyer professional “for the purpose of permitting the 
licensee to provide to clients the services of the professional” if 
certain conditions are met.176  Prior to entering into such an 
arrangement, the licensee must apply to LSUC and be approved.177  
The nonlawyer professional must be of good character, and 
“qualified to practice a profession, trade or occupation that 
supports or supplements the practice of law or the provision of 
legal services.”178  Additionally, the licensee must retain “effective 
control” over the professional’s practice insofar as the professional 
is providing services to the clients of the partnership or 
association.179  Further, the professional must agree to comply with 
                                                     
173 Paton, supra note 161, at 2211. 
174 See By-Law No. 25, supra note 172 (stating the by-law behind multi-
discipline practices).  By-Law No. 25 was “later amended three times in 1999 (May 
28, June 25, and December 10), twice in 2001 (April 26 and May 24), and once in 
2002 (October 31), but the changes [were] not substantial . . . By-Law [No. 25] was 
revoked on May 1, 2007, as part of ’house keeping.’”  Paton, supra note 161, at 
2217 n.106 (internal quotes added).  By-Law 25 exists today under By-Law 7.  See 
id., at 2217 n. 106 (describing the amendments made to By-Law No. 25 and 
referencing By-Law No. 7).  
175 Law Soc’y of Upper Can., By-Law No. 7, pt. III (2009) [hereinafter By-Law 
No. 7], available at http://www.lsuc.on.ca/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx 
?id=2147485808.  
176 Id.  
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. Effective control requires that “the licensee may, without the 
agreement of the professional, take any action necessary to ensure that the 
licensee complies with [the society’s rules, regulations and policies].” 
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the Law Society’s rules, regulations and policies, and must agree 
not to practice his profession, trade or occupation, except to 
provide services to the clients of the partnership or association.180  
Any independent practice of the professional’s occupation must be 
performed outside the premises of the partnership or 
association.181 
In addition, LSUC adopted By-Law 32 on May 24, 2001 to 
regulate affiliations between law firms and other service 
providers.182  Today, By-Law 32 exists in its original form in Part IV 
of By-Law 7, which regulates “affiliated” law firms.183  This 
regulation came about due to the “captive law firm model.”184  The 
concern was with the presence of Donahue & Partners, a law firm 
established in Ontario by the accounting firm Ernst & Young, as 
well as other law firms “captive” to Big Five accounting firms in 
Europe.185  As a result, By-Law 7 imposes a notification 
requirement, and various restrictions, on a licensee that “affiliates 
with an affiliated entity.”186  A licensee “affiliates with an affiliated 
entity when the licensee on a regular basis joins with the affiliated 
entity in the delivery or promotion and delivery of the services of 
the licensee and the services of the affiliated entity.”187  A licensee 
who is involved in such an arrangement must own and maintain 
control over the professional business through which the licensee 
practices law or provides legal services.188  Additionally, there 
must be a physical segregation of the premises from which the 
legal services are delivered from those used by the affiliated entity 
for the delivery of its nonlegal services, “other than those that are 
delivered by the affiliated entity jointly with the delivery of the 
                                                     
180 Id.  
181 Id. 
182 Law Soc’y of Upper Can., By-Law No. 32 (2001), repealed 2007, available at 
http://www.lsuc.on.ca/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=2147485902.  By-
Law No. 32 was repealed on May 1, 2007 and exists today under By-Law No. 7, pt. 
IV.  See Paton, supra note 161, at 2220–21 n.125. 
183 By-Law No. 7, supra note 175, at pt. IV. 
184 Paton, supra note 161, at 2220. 
185 Id., at 2220. 
186 By-Law No. 7, supra note 175, at pt. IV (2009). 
187 Id.  
188 Id.  
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services of the licensee.”189  Finally, no fee splitting or profit 
sharing is permitted between the law firm and the affiliated 
entity.190 
2.3.3. British Columbia 
In 2001, The Law Society of British Columbia (LSBC) 
contemplated a much more liberal regime than the one adopted in 
Ontario.  In fact, the governors of the LSBC (benchers) rejected a 
more restrictive approach stating:  “A restrictive approach may 
preclude sensible and economic arrangements between lawyers 
and members of other occupations that may serve the public 
well.”191  However, although these proposed rule changes received 
a majority of the bencher’s votes, a two-thirds majority was 
necessary to adopt the resolution.192  As a result the resolution was 
rejected in order to protect the “core values” of the profession as 
well as what the benchers called a “lack of demand within the 
profession for such a regulatory scheme.”193  The LSBC did not 
adopt any MDP regime until 2010 when it adopted Rules 2-23.1 to 
2-23.12 into its practice rules.194 
The rules adopted by LSBC function in much the same way as 
MDPs in Ontario.  For example, the lawyer member of the MDP 
must obtain express permission by the LSBC to enter into a 
MDP.195  The nonlawyer members of the MDP must be of “good 
                                                     
189 Id.  Further, it requires notification to the board and an annual filing that 
must include information on the financial arrangement that exists between the 
lawyer and the affiliated entity, as well as other arrangements including the 
ownership, management, control, and compliance with the rules, regulations and 
policies of the society. 
190 LAW SOC’Y OF UPPER CANADA, RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.08(9) (2001).  
191 The Law Soc’y of B.C., Consultation on Multi-Disciplinary Practice, 
BENCHERS’ BULL., no. 1, July-Aug. 2001 Supp., http://www.lawsociety.bc. 
ca/page.cfm?cid=1904. 
192 Paton, supra note 161, at 2225.  
193 The Law Soc’y of B.C., Benchers Say No to Multi-Disciplinary Practice, 
BENCHERS’ BULL., no. 6, Nov.-Dec. 2001 Supp., http://www.lawsociety. 
bc.ca/page.cfm?cid=1854&t=Benchers-s. 
194 THE LAW SOC’Y OF B.C., LAW SOCIETY RS. §§ 2-23.1–2-23.12 (2009), available 
at https://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/page.cfm?cid=979&t=Law-Society-Rules-Part-
2-Membership-and-Authority-to-Practise-Law#2-23-1 [hereinafter LSBC PRACTICE 
RULES].  
195 Id. § 2-23.2(1)(b).  
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character and repute.”196  Additionally, all members must agree in 
writing that the lawyer members of the MPD will have actual 
control over the delivery of legal services, and that nonlawyer 
members will not interfere with the lawyer’s obligation to the rules 
regulations and polices of the LSBC.197 
In October 2011, the LSBC requested that the Independence 
and Self-Governance Committee (“Committee”) examine the 
debate surrounding alternative business structures (including 
models with outside ownership) and outline their views on 
whether or not they should be adopted in British Columbia.198  The 
Committee expressed their concern about “the lack of empirical 
evidence given by proponents of ABSs, and believes that if the only 
demonstrable effect of ABSs was to enrich the legal profession or 
those who invested in it, the image of the profession and the Law 
Society would be tarnished.”199  Thus, the Committee urged that: 
 
some considerable caution needs to be exercised to ensure 
that there is a public value in ABSs (such as improving 
access to legal services) and that valuable public protections 
that currently exist (such as client confidentiality, an 
absence of conflicts of interest, and the public right to an 
independent lawyer) are not lost.200   
 
The Committee concluded that “some outside ownership 
involvement in law firms could be considered, provided it is 
properly regulated and that lawyers remain in control of the 
provision of the legal services offered.”201  However, the 
Committee rejected the notion that law firms be put up for public 
sale through securities markets, because they were “not convinced 
that there are benefits to users of legal services that outweigh 
identified risks.”202  Although the Committee recommended that 
                                                     
196 Id. § 2-23.2(1)(c).  
197 Id. § 2-23.2(1)(d).  
198 The Law Soc’y of B.C., Alternative Business Structures in the Legal 
Profession: Preliminary Discussion and Recommendations (2011), available at 
http://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/docs/publications/reports/AlternativeBusinessStr
uctures.pdf. 
199 Id. at 1.  
200 Id. at 1–2.  
201 Id. at 2. 
202 Id.  
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the LSBC give “serious consideration to ABSs,” they suggested that 
the LSBC wait and see what happens elsewhere:  “The [LSBC] 
should await the outcome of the debate currently underway 
through the American Bar Association.”203 
2.3.4. Quebec 
In Quebec, the Code des professions (Professional Code) was 
amended with regulations in 2010 to provide for a more liberal 
MDP regime than that which exists in Ontario and British 
Columbia.204  The regulations in Quebec require only a “simple 
majority ownership by members of the Barreau du Quebec of the 
firm through which the professional services are provided.”205 
Membership of non laywers is: 
restricted to those members of various other recognized 
professional bodies (including actuaries, patent agents, and 
members of the Chambre de l’assurance de dommages) 
[damage insurance adjusters and brokers] or the Chambre 
de la securite financiere [financial planners and insurance 
agents], but the regulation does not require that their 
activities ‘support or supplement the practice of law’ in the 
manner of the Ontario and British Columbia MDP rules.206 
MDPs are required to: 
 
provide an undertaking to the Barreau du Quebec that in 
essence ensures that all members of the partnership comply 
with rules of law so as to permit the lawyer members to 
carry on their professional activities, particularly as regards 
the following: 
 a) professional secrecy, the confidentiality of information 
contained in client files and the preservation thereof; 
 b) professional independence; 
                                                     
203 Id.  
204 See QUEBEC PROF’L CODE (2014), available at http://www2. 
publicationsduquebec.gouv.qc.ca/dynamicSearch/telecharge.php?type=2&file=/
C_26/C26_A.HTM; Ethics Comm’n Request for Cmt. of April 2011, supra note 27, 
at 12. 
205 Ethics Comm’n Request for Cmt. of April 2011, supra note 27, at 12. 
206 Id. at 12 (translations in original) (footnote omitted). 
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 c) the prevention of situations of conflict of interests; 
 d) activities reserved for advocates; 
 e) liability insurance; 
 f) professional inspections; 
 g) advertising; 
 h) billing and trust accounts; and 
 i) access by the syndic of the Barreau to this undertaking 
and, if applicable, to every contract or agreement regarding 
a [member of the Barreau].207 
2.4. Other Jurisdictions 
Jurisdictions in addition to England, Australia, and Canada 
have been considering whether to permit multidisciplinary 
practices and ownership of interests in law firms by nonlawyers.  
In particular, various European countries are studying whether to 
liberalize restrictions on the practice of law.  France, Spain, and 
Scotland have studies or proposals in this regard.208 
The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(“OECD”) released a report in 2007 questioning the regulation of 
the legal profession.209  This report asserted that regulation and 
self-regulation of the legal profession appear “to serve mainly the 
private interests of the profession rather than broader consumer 
interests.”210  The report found the restrictions on ownership and 
management of law firms difficult to justify because these 
restrictions limit the available sources of capital for a law firm and 
because spreading the risk by allowing more widespread 
ownership could reduce prices to clients.  Also, prohibiting 
nonlawyer management may “stifle more efficient and innovative 
methods of delivering legal services to consumers.”211  Further, the 
OECD rejected the argument that financial control of law firms by 
                                                     
207 Id. at 13 (citing QUEBEC PROF’L CODE Sched. B (s.3)).  
208 Cox, supra note 4, at 538–39. 
209 OECD, COMPETITIVE RESTRICTIONS IN LEGAL PROFESSIONS (2007), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/regreform/liberalisationandcompetitioninterventioninreg
ulatedsectors/40080343.pdf. 
210 Id. at 9. 
211 Id. at 50.  
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nonlawyers would improperly influence lawyers by putting 
commercial interests ahead of client interests “since lawyers are 
not less driven by profits than their commercial counterparts.”212  
This OECD Report seems to have had a greater impact in Europe 
than elsewhere, but the United States is a member of the OECD 
and so its views regarding competition should be heeded. 
3. THE JACOBY AND MEYERS LITIGATION 
On May 18, 2011, Jacoby & Meyers, LLP (Plaintiffs) filed a 
complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
New York against the Presiding Justices of the First, Second, Third 
and Fourth Departments of the Appellate Division of the Supreme 
Court of the State of New York (N.Y. Defendants), challenging 
ABA Rule 5.4 and its state law counterparts on a variety of 
constitutional grounds.213  The Plaintiffs challenged Rule 5.4 of the 
New York Rules of Professional Conduct, which prohibits lawyers 
from practicing law for profit in an entity in which a nonlawyer 
has an ownership interest.  The Plaintiffs filed a similar complaint 
on the same day against the Justices of the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey (N.J. Defendants) in the U.S. District Court for the District of 
New Jersey214 and against the Judges of the Connecticut Superior 
Court of the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut.215 
In their original New York Complaint, Plaintiffs set forth a 
lengthy list of reasons why Rule 5.4 is antiquated and should be 
changed.  First, the rule prevents law firms from competing in 
today’s global marketplace, restricts public access to “affordable, 
quality representation,” and impedes law firms’ ability to “raise 
the capital necessary to pay for improvements in technology and 
infrastructure, and to expand its offices and hire additional 
personnel.”216  The traditional modes of obtaining capital—through 
                                                     
212 Id. 
213 Jacoby & Meyers, LLP v. Presiding Justices of First, Second, Third & 
Fourth Depts., Appellate Div. of Supreme Court of New York, 847 F. Supp. 2d 590 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012).  
214 Jacoby & Meyers Law Offices, LLP v. Justices of the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey, No. 11-cv-2866-JAP (D.N.J. filed May 18, 2011). 
215 Jacoby & Meyers Law Offices, LLP v. Judges of the Connecticut Superior 
Court, No. 3:11-cv-00817-CFD (D. Conn. filed May 18, 2011). 
216 Complaint at para. 1, Jacoby & Meyers, 847 F. Supp. 2d 590 (No. 11 Civ. 
3387).  
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personal contributions of the partners and commercial bank 
loans—are unavailable to firms like Jacoby & Meyers and, 
although the firm has had capital contribution offers from 
nonlawyer investors, it has been unable to take advantage of such 
offers due to the prohibitions of Rule 5.4.217 
Second, the current ethical system “perpetuates economic 
inequity” between small law firms with no access to the capital 
markets, and those on Wall Street, as well as between Wall Street 
firms and firms in England and Australia, where lawyers are 
allowed to accept funding from nonlawyers.218  In England and 
Australia, there are alternative safeguards in place to ensure that 
nonlawyer equity investors do not interfere with lawyers’ 
professional responsibilities, and the system has worked well in 
both countries.219 
Third, one need only look to the practice of the District of 
Columbia, where lawyers may partner with nonlawyers, to see that 
the restrictions of Rule 5.4 are unwarranted.  No “violation of 
clients’ confidences” or “erosion of lawyers’ independent 
judgment” in D.C has ever occurred.220  Indeed, “the claimed evils 
most often advanced by critics of outside, nonlawyer 
investment . . . have not materialized in the wake of others’ efforts 
to allow such outside investments.”221  Finally, Rule 5.4 should no 
longer be enforced because “no compelling legal argument or 
public policy rationale exists to prevent lawyers from raising 
capital in the same manner as any other business.”222 
Because of these reasons, Plaintiffs’ first Complaint sought to 
enjoin the enforcement of Rule 5.4 against them and other similarly 
situated law firms, and a declaration that the Rule violates:  (1) the 
Judiciary Law, (2) the Dormant Commerce Clause, (3) the Equal 
Protection and Due Process Clauses, (4) Plaintiffs’ First 
Amendment rights to free speech and association, and (5) that the 
Rule constitutes a regulatory taking without compensation.223 
                                                     
217 Id. at para. 28. 
218 Id. at para. 4. 
219 Id. at para. 33. 
220 Id. at para. 5. 
221 Id. 
222 Id. at para. 6. 
223 Id. 
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The New York Defendants subsequently moved to dismiss the 
Complaint on July 15, 2011, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  During the oral argument 
held before Judge Kaplan on February 7, 2012, the Court stated that 
Plaintiffs “faced a significant uphill battle to establish standing,” 
but that Plaintiffs’ claims were ripe and that the Court “should 
entertain the case rather than abstain.”224  Afterwards, Plaintiffs 
were granted leave to amend their complaint to correct certain 
procedural defects.  On November 23, 2011, Plaintiffs filed an 
Amended Complaint, naming Jacoby & Meyer USA, LLC, as an 
additional Plaintiff, and thus rendered the Defendant’s first Motion 
to Dismiss moot. 225 
The Amended Complaint reiterated the same policy arguments 
against Rule 5.4 as discussed above and stated that Jacoby & 
Meyers, LLP, had recently created the LLC, Jacoby & Meyers USA, 
“for the express purpose of allowing nonlawyers to ‘own an 
interest’ in the entity through which Jacoby & Meyers is authorized 
to practice law for profit.”226  Plaintiffs stated that Jacoby & Meyers, 
LLP, was immediately prepared “to transfer all of its assets to 
Jacoby & Meyers USA, LLC and immediately obtain nonlawyer 
investment—as soon as Rule 5.4’s blanket suppression of 
nonlawyer ownership of an interest in law firms is declared 
unconstitutional and its enforcement permanently enjoined.”227  In 
this way, the New York Defendants could no longer claim that 
Plaintiffs’ inability to add a nonlawyer partner to their firm was 
barred by New York State Partnership Law, since their newly 
created entity was a LLC not subject to Partnership Law.228 
                                                     
224 Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint at 1, Jacoby & Meyers, LLP v. Presiding Justices of 
First, Second, Third & Fourth Depts., Appellate Div. of Supreme Court of New 
York, 847 F. Supp. 2d 590 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 11 Civ. 3387) [hereinafter 
Memorandum in Suppprt to Dismiss].  
225 Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at para. 14, 
Jacoby & Meyers, 847 F. Supp. 2d. 
226 Id. 
227 Id. 
228 Defendants argued in their first Motion to Dismiss that Plaintiffs had no 
standing to sue because New York State Partnership Law, not Rule 5.4, prevented 
them from adding a nonlawyer partner to their firm.  See Memorandum in 
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On December 23, 2011, the New York Defendants moved to 
dismiss the complaint.  The bulk of the parties’ arguments 
concerned the procedural and jurisdictional aspects of Plaintiffs’ 
claims, and the defendants chose to address standing, ripeness, 
immunity, and abstention.  On March 8, 2012, Judge Kaplan issued 
a decision holding that Plaintiffs did not have standing to raise the 
constitutional claims advanced in their complaint because they are 
a limited liability company and a limited liability partnership, and, 
as such, are a “corporation or voluntary association” within the 
meaning of Section 495 of the New York Judiciary Law. 229  This 
decision bars the Plaintiffs from obtaining nonlawyer ownership 
equity independently of Rule 5.4.230  As such, Plaintiffs had no 
standing to bring this suit and, because “the ruling that they seek 
would be a purely advisory declaration of the sort that is forbidden 
to federal courts under Article III of the U.S. Constitution,” the 
action was dismissed.231  Accordingly, the Court did not address 
the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims against the New York Defendants. 
The Plaintiffs appealed the District Court decision, and on 
November 21, 2012, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals remanded 
the case to the District Court and instructed the lower court to 
vacate the original judgment and allow the Plaintiffs to amend 
their complaint.232  The Second Circuit opinion stated that “the 
district court can proceed to adjudicate the parties’ dispute as to 
whether [Section 495 of the New York Judiciary Law, Section 201 of 
New York LLC Law] and Rule 5.4 are constitutional.”233  As a 
result, the merits of the Plaintiffs’ claims will ultimately be 
addressed by the New York Court. 
Judge Sheridan took a different approach in the New Jersey 
case, where the New Jersey Defendants also made a motion to 
dismiss.  He held that it was best for the Court to restrain its 
authority in light of the rightful independence of the New Jersey 
                                                     
Suppprt to Dismiss, supra note 224, at 5 (stating that the Partnership Law 
precludes the hiring of a nonlawyer at a law firm). 
229 Jacoby & Meyers, 847 F. Supp. 2d at 597. 
230 Id. at 591–92. 
231 Id. 
232 Jacoby & Meyers, LLP v. Presiding Justices of First, Second, Third & 
Fourth Dep’ts, App. Div. of Sup. Ct. of State of N.Y., 488 F. App’x 526 (2d Cir. 
2012), as amended (Jan. 9, 2013). 
233 Id. at 527. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss2/4
04_KARMEL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/12/2014  3:42 PM 
2013] WILL LAW FIRMS GO PUBLIC? 529 
Supreme Court over Rule 5.4(d), and therefore he denied the 
motion to dismiss and remitted the issue of an Alternative Business 
Structure, as proposed by Jacoby & Meyers, to the New Jersey 
Supreme Court.234 
A motion to dismiss in Connecticut by the Connecticut 
defendants has not yet been decided. 
Whether any rights protected either by the U.S. Constitution or 
the constitutions of the States of New York, New Jersey, or 
Connecticut are abridged by the prohibition against partnerships 
or other forms of business organizations that include both lawyers 
and nonlawyers are complicated issues.  For obvious political 
reasons, federal district court judges would rather not decide these 
questions in cases against state judges.  Whether the U.S. Supreme 
Court might entertain these cases is another question.235 
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,236 the Supreme Court struck 
down suggested minimum fees for legal services imposed by the 
Virginia State Bar.  In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,237 the Supreme 
Court struck down bans against lawyer advertising as contrary to 
the First Amendment.  In NAACP v. Button,238 the Supreme Court 
held that the states could not ban the delivery of legal services 
through a nonprofit corporation.  This precedent was then 
extended to permit unions to offer legal services to their 
members.239  In Citizens United v. FEC,240 the Supreme Court held 
that the Government may not suppress political speech by 
                                                     
234 Jacoby & Meyers Law Offices, LLP v. Justices of Sup. Ct. of N.J., (No. 11-
2866) (D.N.J. filed May 18, 2011). 
235 Seemingly independent of its pending litigation in U.S. federal courts, 
Jacoby & Meyers announced in August 2013 its participation in a joint venture 
with a U.K. firm in order to create “the world’s largest privately-owned, full-
service consumer legal group” to be based in the United Kingdom.  Jacoby & 
Meyers Builds Platform in the U.K. for a Global Build-Out, JACOBY & MEYERS LAW 
OFFICES (Aug. 8, 2013), http://www.jacobymeyers.com/blog/jacoby-meyers-
builds-platform-uk-global-build-out.html.  The new firm, Jacoby & Meyers 
Europe Limited, will be owned by Jacoby & Meyers, LLP, and affiliated with MJ 
Hudson.  Id.  Going forward, the firm expects to seek ABS status in the United 
Kingdom to solicit for nonlawyer equity ownership and funding.  Id. 
236 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
237 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
238 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
239 United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); United 
Mine Workers of Am. v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967). 
240 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
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corporations.  Whether these cases and some related decisions 
amount to a theory that the First Amendment’s protections of 
speech, assembly, and association make state prohibitions on 
business combinations between lawyers and nonlawyers 
unconstitutional has been argued by some241 and opposed by 
others.242 
The ABA appears to have determined that organizations that 
do not operate at a profit can provide legal services, but for profit 
entities cannot do so if they profit from these services.243  Recently, 
many states have made provision for the incorporation of benefit 
and flexible purpose corporations, which straddle a space between 
for-profit and non-profit corporations.  The benefit corporation 
commits its owners to pursue social or philanthropic objectives, 
although shareholder profits may also be pursued.  However, there 
is no obligation to give shareholders priority.244  Flexible purpose 
corporations similarly would allow customers, the community, or 
society to trump shareholder interests.245  If the bar were more 
serious about protecting professional values over protecting 
economic interests, it might consider adapting these corporate 
forms to law firms so that law firms could join with nonlawyers 
either as shareholders or in other capacities, but client interests 
would nevertheless trump shareholder interests.  This proposition 
is similar to the way in which the regulation of law firms evolved 
in Australia. 
Jacoby & Meyers did not sue for relief under the antitrust laws.  
At one time there was thought to be a “learned profession” 
                                                     
241 See Knake, supra note 19 (arguing that current restrictions on nonlawyer 
ownership of law firms may be unjustified); Gary A. Munneke, Dances with 
Nonlawyers: A New Perspective on Law Firm Diversification, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 559 
(1992).   
242 Brief for Conn. Bar Ass’n. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendants at 2, 
Jacoby & Meyers Law Offices v. Justices of Sup. Ct. of N.J., No. 11-cv-2866 (D.N.J. 
filed May 18, 2011) (No. 11-cv-00817).  
243 See Andrews, supra note 58, at 589–90 (arguing that this distinction 
prevents the potential harms envisioned by opponents of allowing nonlawyer 
ownership of law firms). 
244 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 14620(d) (West 2011) (codifying this lack of 
shareholder priority); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1707(a)(1)–(3) (McKinney 2011) 
(codifying this lack of shareholder priority). 
245 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2602 (West 2011) (providing an example of flexible 
purpose corporation and its unique guidelines). 
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exemption from the antitrust laws,246 but the Supreme Court 
rejected this concept in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.247  
Nevertheless, in an earlier case, Parker v. Brown,248 the Court 
adopted the “state action” exemption from the antitrust laws in 
situations where state regulation required conduct the antitrust 
laws prohibited.  This doctrine has generally protected legal ethics 
from attacks under the antitrust laws, except in cases involving 
blatant price fixing.249 
The restraint against nonlawyer and lawyer association in a 
law firm is a standard of a voluntary non-governmental 
organization, the ABA, and therefore is not sovereign action.  
Nevertheless, this ban has been adopted by state bar associations, 
and generally is approved and enforced by the state courts.  
Whether this acceptance should make any difference is an 
interesting question, but it seems pertinent that the restrictions 
against equity investment in law firms by nonlawyers was 
abolished in England and Australia on antitrust grounds.  In a 
different context, involving the membership rules of the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE), the U.S. Supreme Court held that an 
implied repeal of the antitrust laws by the federal securities laws 
existed only to the extent necessary to make securities regulation 
work.250  A similar rationale could perhaps be applied to Rule 5.4 
of the ABA and the states that have adopted it.  In other words, are 
these bans necessary to protect the core values of the legal 
profession or could these values be protected in other, less anti-
competitive ways? 
4. THE EVOLUTION OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 
Lawyers make much of their professionalism, but “to term 
them noncommercial is sanctimonious humbug.”251  Further, other 
                                                     
246 Thomas D. Morgan, The Impact of Antitrust Law on the Legal Profession, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 415, 419 (1998). 
247 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975). 
248 317 U.S. 341, 350–51 (1943). 
249 See Morgan, supra note 246, at 423–27, 436–39 (discussing various 
scenarios where antitrust law would apply to law firms; including, price fixing, 
lawyer arranged boycotts, and conspiracies between law firms relating to 
advertising practices). 
250 Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963). 
251 Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 368 n.19 (1977) (citing 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 64). 
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industries have confronted the problem of eliminating restrictions 
on their form of organization and financing.  In this part, this 
Article will discuss the elimination of such restrictions on securities 
firms that were members of the NYSE and the NYSE itself.  While 
the results of these changes in the organizational form of these 
firms have been both beneficial and detrimental, if lawyers find 
that alternative business structures are necessary, they will push 
for the abolition of absolute bans on lawyer-nonlawyer 
associations. 
Until 1953, only individuals could be members of the NYSE, 
and all exchange member firms were required to do business as 
partnerships.  Further, all member firms were required to be 
primarily engaged in a public securities business.252  The rationale 
for these regulations was related to the mutual form of exchange 
organization.  When making a trade, an exchange member had to 
be trusted to stand behind the trade.253  Because all partners are 
liable for the debts of a partnership, the personal wealth of every 
firm partner guaranteed stock exchange trading contracts.  This 
regime worked reasonably well when commission rates were fixed 
and all orders in exchange listed stocks were required to be 
executed over an exchange.254  In addition to contributing to the 
financial stability of the NYSE, these regulations kept institutions, 
which were the customers of exchange members, from becoming 
exchange members.255 
After the paperwork crisis on Wall Street in the 1960s, and the 
unfixing of stock exchange commission rates in 1975, it became 
apparent that the traditional regime of the brokerage firm 
partnership form was doomed.  In the 1960s, over 150 securities 
firms failed.256  In addition to the problems unleashed by the 
                                                     
252 See PBW Stock Exch., Inc. v. SEC, 485 F.2d 718, 720 (3d Cir. 1973) 
(discussing the application of the “’institutional membership’ rule” to all members 
of the exchange); ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES 
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA 118–20 (1982) (explaining that 
this regulatory scheme provided for the self-policing of the finacial industry). 
253 See Jay F. Coughenour & Daniel N. Deli, Liquidity Provision and the 
Organizational Form of NYSE Specialist Firms, 57 J. FIN. 841, 844 (2002). 
254 KARMEL, supra note 252, at 129–31. 
255 See Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369, 375 (1st Cir. 1971) (reasoning that since 
“all brokers, to be members, must be engaged primarily in brokerage” the 
defendants “would not have been able to qualify for membership”). 
256 CHARLES R. GEISST, WALL STREET: A HISTORY 296 (1997). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss2/4
04_KARMEL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/12/2014  3:42 PM 
2013] WILL LAW FIRMS GO PUBLIC? 533 
unfixing of brokerage commissions in the next decade, the 
structure of the underwriting business was challenged, and sales 
and trading with institutional customers became more important 
even to the wire houses.257 
In 1953, the NYSE allowed its member firms to incorporate.  
Woodcock Hess & Co. and A.G. Becker & Co. were the first to do 
so and remain member firms.258  In 1959, Merrill Lynch, Pierce 
Fenner & Smith, a large, nationwide wire house catering to retail 
customers, incorporated.259  Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, a firm 
that catered to institutional customers by executing their trades, 
also incorporated in 1959, and then it became a public company in 
1971.260  Merrill Lynch soon followed with an initial public 
offering.  These offerings were in response to a 1970 relaxation of 
the rules of the NYSE allowing member firms to go public.261 
These changes occurred because of the greatly increased need 
for capital required to run a securities business, and the financial 
needs of the securities industry generally.262  The number of 
customers and the volume of trading greatly increased, and firms 
were required to invest large amounts of money in computerizing 
their back offices.  The partnership form of business organization 
could not raise sufficient capital to support the business of large 
firms.  Subordinated loans, which were counted as regulatory 
capital, were not a viable long-term solution to business needs.263  
The problems of partnership succession and the unwieldy nature 
                                                     
257 Id. at 297–98.   
258 JERRY W. MARKHAM, 2 A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM 
J.P. MORGAN TO THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (1900–1970) 292 (2002). 
259 Michael J. Kaufman, Living in A Material World: Strict Liability Under Rule 
10b-5, 19 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 67 (1990).  
260 CHARLES R. GEISST, THE LAST PARTNERSHIPS: INSIDE THE GREAT WALL STREET 
MONEY DYNASTIES 226–27 (2001). 
261 Alan D. Morrison & William J. Wilhelm, Jr. The Demise of Investment-
Banking Partnerships: Theory and Evidence 31 (Oxford Centre, Working Paper, 2004), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=569109 (noting 
how the NYSE amended its rules in 1970 to admit publicly quoted members).  
262 See GEISST, supra note 260, at 206–07, 227–28 (articulating how the 
changing financial landscape required firms to go public in order to meet their 
capital demands). 
263 See CHRIS WELLES, THE LAST DAYS OF THE CLUB 153-54 (1975).  Several 
prospectus for brokerage firm public offerings stated that the proceeds of the 
offering would be used to retire subordinated loans.  Under stock exchange rules, 
these loans could not be repaid if repayment would jeopardize a firm’s 
compliance with net capital regulations.  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
04_KARMEL (DO NOT DELETE)  3/12/2014  3:42 PM 
534 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 35:2 
of large securities firm partnerships also contributed to the need to 
incorporate and then go public.264 
Not all NYSE member firms incorporated and went public 
even when such an organization was allowed.  Goldman Sachs 
remained a partnership until 1999, and was able to do so because it 
was enormously profitable, and it compelled partners to leave 
capital in the firm.265  Lazard Freres chose to remain a partnership 
for even longer, but eventually went public in May of 2005.266 
The impetus for going public was the need for capital.  
“Without adequate equity capital on their books, the investment 
banks could not underwrite enough deals or make their influence 
felt on Wall Street . . . .  Even when the firms had surplus capital, 
their futures were still not certain because, as their partners retired, 
they withdrew their capital, shrinking the firms’ financial bases.”267  
Another theory, espoused by Professors Morrison and Wilhelm, 
regarding the transformation of securities firm partnerships into 
large public corporations is that going public was a response to 
“technological innovations in both information technology and 
finance.”268 
According to this theory, “[p]artnerships will not make capital 
investments when the costs of idle capital are sufficiently large: the 
going public decision therefore boils down to a trade-off between 
investment in human and physical capital.”269  In the 1960s, the 
increase in computer power allowed certain types of securities 
firms to substitute computers “for human capital in . . . settling 
transactions, maintaining client balances, [and] mailing 
confirmations . . . .”270  Retail rather than wholesale firms took 
advantage of the opportunity to go public at this time.  Later, the 
development of the microcomputer led to financial engineering 
and the creation of new products that decreased the bid/ask 
                                                     
264 See GEISST, supra note 260, at 226 (explaining how aging partners draw 
capital from the firm upon retirement). 
265 Id. at 307–10 (noting the pressures Goldman faced to go public even 
though it remained a profitable firm). 
266 See LAZARD LTD., ANNUAL REPORT 2005 Form 10-K (2006) (detailing the 
organization’s finances as a public company). 
267 GEISST, supra note 260, at 314–15. 
268 Morrison & Wilhelm, supra note 261,  at 2. 
269 Id. at 4. 
270 Id. 
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spread, and therefore the wholesale firms needed additional 
financial capital and went public.271  For both retail and wholesale 
firms, competitive pressures to expand pushed them into 
becoming public companies, thereby substituting financial capital 
for human capital.272 
Although the above thesis has some appeal, it is an incomplete 
analysis of why securities firms went public.  An examination of 
the “Use of Proceeds” section of some of the early initial public 
offerings reflects that firms were concerned about the expected 
deregulation of stock exchange commission rates and increased 
capital requirements of their regulators.273  Although this 
explanation for the public offerings of wire houses fits to some 
extent into the Morrison and Wilhelm thesis, the prospectus for the 
initial public offering of Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette stated that 
proceeds from the offering would be used to support the firm’s 
block positioning activities, a business in which Goldman Sachs 
was also prominent.  However, Goldman Sachs did not go public 
until much later. 
The same economic pressures that led to the breakdown of the 
partnership form of organization for securities firms also led to the 
demutualization and public company status of the NYSE.  The 
NYSE incorporated in 1971, although the SEC was concerned that 
this step would impair the effectiveness of the exchange as a self-
regulatory organization (SRO).274  Nevertheless, the exchange 
continued to operate as a mutual organization for the benefit of its 
members until 2003, when scandals involving the chairman of the 
exchange and stock exchange specialists led to a board 
reorganization that positioned the exchange for a public offering.275  
                                                     
271 Id. at 5. 
272 Id. at 31–32. 
273 See, e.g., BACHE & CO., INC., PROSPECTUS FOR 2,500,000 SHARES OF COMMON 
STOCK 3–4, 8–9 (1971); MERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER & SMITH, INC., PROSPECTUS 
FOR 4,000,000 SHARES OF COMMON STOCK 4, 10–11 (1971).  
274 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9112, 1971 SEC LEXIS 98 (Mar. 17, 
1971) (reporting how the commission asked for consideration regarding the 
potential conflict between limiting liability for members and still being an 
effective self-regulatory organization). 
275 See Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory 
Organizations Be Considered Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 151, 
164–65 (2008) (noting how scandals involving the chairman and CEO of the NYSE 
led to doubts about its self-regulatory capacities and long-term viability). 
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The exchange then went public through a reverse merger with 
Archipelago Holdings, Inc., thus sidestepping long negotiations 
with the SEC with respect to a public offering that the NASD went 
through.276  This suited powerful members of the securities 
industry, which had invested large sums in electronic trading 
networks and wished to break up the NYSE’s quasi-monopoly on 
trading listed securities.277 
As a result of the incorporation and public offerings of NYSE 
member firms and the NYSE itself, the securities industry has 
expanded and become part of the banking industry.  Although this 
has enabled U.S. firms to compete with foreign universal banks, 
there is a serious question as to whether this growth has been 
beneficial to the capital markets.  The financial meltdown of 2008 
and the resulting reduction in the number of large U.S. banks that 
are players in the global markets may be the end game in the 
restructuring of the securities industry that began with the 
transformation of securities firms from partnerships to giant too-
big-to-fail banks.  Similarly, the fragmentation of the securities 
markets into fifty or more trading venues278 is the result of the 
destruction of the NYSE specialist system, which operated as a 
mutual company.  Although these developments can be looked 
upon as the creative destruction of a capitalist system, many 
wonder whether the giant banks should be broken up, and also 
whether new regulation for the trading markets is necessary to 
alleviate the occurrence of “flash crashes.”279 
                                                     
276 Id. at 165. 
277 See id. at 167–68 (“some small broker-dealers who were not NYSE 
members brought a lawsuit alleging that their interests had been overrun by the 
large NYSE member firms.”). 
278 See Rachelle Younglai & Jonathan Spicer, U.S. Probes Trading Practices in 
Fragmented Markets, REUTERS (Dec. 8, 2010, 7:04 PM)), http://www.reuters. 
com/article/2010/12/09/us-financial-regulation-markets-
idUSTRE6B714820101209 (reporting that a congressional hearing listed “lack of 
surveillance” of these entities as a problem to address to avoid a future “flash 
crash”).  
279 Id.  See also, e.g., Sebastian Mallaby, Breaking Up the Banks Will Win 
Investors’ Approval, FIN. TIMES, July 18, 2012, at 9 (“If regulators want a ‘reasonable’ 
policy that will be accepted by the equity market, they should break up the giant 
banks.”); Sandy Weill Stages an Epic Conversion—Better to Restore Glass-Steagall Than 
a Weak Volcker Rule, FIN. TIMES, July 27, 2012, at 8 (“Now all of a sudden Sandy 
Weill, . . . a driving force behind the abolition of the Glass-Steagall act, is calling 
for a return to status quo ante.”).  But see Art Johnson, Proposals to Break Up Big 
Banks Threaten All Banks, AM. BANKER (Aug. 1, 2012, 11:15 AM), http://www. 
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It is important to note that the securities industry is no longer 
self-regulated, except with regard to the regulatory oversight of 
brokerage firms by FINRA.280  This regulation primarily relates to 
responsibilities of broker-dealers to their customers.  The NYSE is 
no longer a significant regulator, since it transferred most of its 
regulatory responsibilities to FINRA, and the largest securities 
firms became bank holding companies during the 2008 financial 
crisis and are now regulated primarily by the Federal Reserve 
Board. 
5. THE FUTURE OF LAW FIRMS 
The author has grave concerns about the present structure of 
the securities industry and the capital markets,281 and is not 
advocating that law firms traverse a similar path.  Endless 
expansion in response to decreased profitability of core businesses 
is not necessarily a public benefit.  Nevertheless, if Big Law begins 
to feel competitive pressures to reduce rates and costs and at the 
same time to expand, and it needs capital in order to do so, it is 
likely that the ethics rules preventing nonlawyer ownership of 
firms will erode.  It is also possible that smaller firms or innovative 
organizations trying to serve low-income clients could upend Rule 
5.4.282  Until now, law firms have financed growth and operations 
through capital investments by their partners and loans from 
banks and other sources.  But these sources of funding require 
                                                     
americanbanker.com/bankthink/proposals-to-break-up-big-banks-threaten-all-
banks-1051477-1.html (“[A]n attempt to break up the large banks would hurt each 
and every one of us.”); Steven Rattner, Regulate, Don’t Split Up, Huge Banks, N.Y. 
TIMES  (July 31, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/01/opinion/sanford-
weills-glass-steagall-distraction.html?_r=0 (“Good management will always be 
more effective in avoiding bad outcomes than legislation . . . .”). 
280 Roberta Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory Organizations Be 
Considered Government Agencies?, 14 Stan. J. L. Bus. & Fin. 151 (2008).   
281 See generally Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Public Utility Holding Company Act a 
Model for Breaking Up the Banks That Are Too-Big-To-Fail?, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 821 
(2011). 
282 See Janson v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (W.D. Mo. 2011) 
(adjudicating a class action lawsuit for unauthorized practice of law against 
LegalZoom, a small business that produced legal documents for customers who 
filled out the forms themselves via an online portal).  Although LegalZoom was 
held to be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by providing legal 
documents over the Internet for do-it-yourself clients, and then editing them, 
providing the legal documents was held not to be practicing law.  Id. 
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large outlays.  Greenberg Traurig recently made a capital call on its 
partners for $24 million.283  Dewey & LeBoeuf was bankrupted by 
its large bank loans, and it was not the first law firm to find itself in 
such a difficult situation.284  Firms that distribute 100% of their 
profits rather than holding back partnership capital for investment 
can face the same pressures that caused Dewey to collapse.285 
Like the securities firms of the 1960s and 1970s, law firms have 
discovered that some of the legal work previously done by 
associates can either be consigned to computers or outsourced to 
less expensive lawyers.  Though it is unlikely that computers will 
be able to argue cases before a jury, they are doing much of the 
discovery work previously done by humans.  If technology 
becomes more important in the provision of legal services, and 
requires large capital outlays by firms, or if law firms become 
capital hungry for other reasons, law firms may well follow the 
path of investment banking firms and give up the advantages of 
the partnership form.  Furthermore, is a law firm of 1,000 partners 
really an old fashioned general partnership or it simply a big 
business in partnership form?286  Because of the LLP form of 
professional organization, not all partners are even liable any 
longer for the debts or malpractice of their putative partners.  
Neither are they paid in lock step arrangements.  These firms are 
corporations in all but name, with centralized management and 
hierarchical arrangements.  Some law firms would undoubtedly 
benefit from professional business management by nonlawyers. 
My thesis is that sooner or later law firms will be allowed to 
raise equity capital, and the bar should prepare for this eventuality 
instead of denying it is a possibility.  This could happen as the 
result of one state deciding that it will facilitate such a process, 
                                                     
283 Debra Cassens Weiss, Greenberg Traurig Asks Partners to Pony Up More Cash 
in $24M Capital Call, ABA J. (Aug. 8, 2012, 6:19 AM), http://www.abajournal. 
com/news/article/greenberg_traurig_asks_partners_to_pony_up_more_cash_in_
24m_capital_call.   
284 Rich Smith, How Dewey & LeBoeuf Became the Biggest Law Firm Bankruptcy 
Ever, DAILY FIN. (June 15, 2012, 10:37 AM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/ 
2012/06/15/a-bankruptcy-you-might-applaud-bye-bye-dewey-and-leboeuf/.  
285 Paul Lippe, Is Your Firm Playing ‘Dewey Roulette’?, ABA J. (Aug. 15, 2012, 
1:52 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/legalrebels/article/dewey_roulette/. 
286 Cf. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 78–79 (1984) (reversing 
both district court and appellate court judgments to conclude that Title VII applies 
to the selection of candidates to a law firm partnership). 
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through legislation or action of the judiciary, or the Supreme Court 
or a state high court holding that current rules of legal ethics are 
uncompetitive or unconstitutional.  Alternatively, the Department 
of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission could instigate action 
to revoke anti-competitive ABA rules.287  Should this happen, self-
regulation will be affected, as it was in the securities industry when 
investment firms and exchanges went public288 and in England 
when ethical rules were changed to permit equity investments in 
law firms.  Lawyers are already not entirely self-regulated, as some 
government oversight by the SEC was imposed by Sarbanes-
Oxley.289  Further, certain earmarks of lawyer professionalism, 
particularly independence and the duty of confidentiality, would 
need to be safeguarded or they could be lost.  Considering how to 
preserve these values in the face of dynamic and changing business 
models for law firms is a large task that was initially embarked 
upon, but not completed, by the ABA Ethics Commission.  Sooner 
or later, however, the legal profession will need to confront how to 
preserve its core values in the face of global competition and 
economic and technological challenges that may well lead to the 
need to raise capital from nonlawyers. 
 
                                                     
287 In 1987, the FTC argued that rules limiting lawyers and nonlawyers to join 
the same firm were incompatible with antitrust policy and sent letters urging 
courts and bar committees to change their rules.  See Andrews, supra note 58, at 
620 (“[T]he FTC has taken the position that the lawyer ethics rules prohibiting 
lawyers from forming legal services firms with nonlawyers should be 
abolished.”). 
288 See Karmel, supra note 275, at 159–60, 196–97 (detailing that in response to 
certain financial climate changes, the SEC has increased greater power over 
SROs). 
289 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.100–205.7 (1995).  
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